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SINCE World War II, a fundamental objective of the foreign policy of the United States has been to strengthen political 
and economic relationships among free-world nations. An integral 
element of this policy has been the expansion of international 
trade on mutually beneficial terms. The legal and practical prob-
lems of reducing or eliminating restrictions on the international 
movement of commodities have therefore assumed a major im-
portance. 
International commodity transactions have traditionally been 
subject to a wide range of such restrictions. In the case of imports, 
the most familiar barriers are tariffs and formal quotas or em-
bargoes imposed by national governments. In recent years, how-
ever, the major industrialized nations have tended toward a 
gradual reduction in tariff levels. Concurrently with this trend, 
and partially in consequence of it, there has developed an increas-
ing awareness that other forms of import restrictions may consti-
tute equal or even greater obstacles to trade. 
It must be anticipated that nations will tend to rely increas-
ingly upon non-tariff import restrictions if tariffs continue to be 
reduced. The present discussion describes the principal types of 
• Member of the District of Columbia and Ohio Bars.-Ed. 
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these restrictions which are prevalent today and analyzes the sub-
stantive and procedural authority of the President under United 
States law to persuade other nations to remove them. 
In order to confine the discussion within manageable bounds, 
the following limitations have been adopted: 
First, the extensive and complex field of import controls ap-
plicable to agricultural and comparable products is not consid-
ered. Restrictions in that area are conditioned by specialized 
economic and political factors, which are frequently reflected in 
the existence of domestic subsidy programs. National policies that 
have been evolved to deal with imports of these products are 
correspondingly specialized and are therefore not always repre-
sentative of the more general problems presented by non-tariff 
trade barriers applicable to other types of commodities.1 
Second, no consideration is given to restrictions applicable to 
capital movements, the physical transfer of securities, or similar 
international transactions. Restrictions on the availability and 
cost of foreign exchange are included only insofar as they are 
relevant to the discussion of obstacles to commodity imports. 
Third, although no consideration is given to tariffs per se, 
reference is made to certain specialized types of tariffs, such as 
tariff quotas and multi-column preferential tariffs, which have 
restrictive characteristics in addition to those inherent in tariff 
schedules of general applicability. Consideration is also given to 
additional forms of customs levies, such as surcharges, import 
taxes, supplementary taxes, and similar devices. 
Fourth, although domestic economic measures as such are not 
discussed, mention is made of subsidy and similar programs within 
the importing country insofar as they may have the effect of 
placing imported commodities at a competitive disadvantage. 
Fifth, commercial factors, including differences in specifica-
1 The omission of non-tariff restrictions on agricultural imports is not intended to 
suggest that they are less widespread or less significant than restrictions applicable to 
non-agricultural imports. The reverse is frequently true. Restrictions in the agricultural 
field are often more extensive than those in other areas and are usually more difficult 
to eliminate. The recent "chicken war" between the United States and the European 
Economic Community is one of many examples of their potentially disruptive impact on 
world trade. A 1962 GATT report points out, "There has been extensive resort to 
the use of nontariff devices, whether or not in conformity with the General Agreement, 
which, in many cases, has impaired or nullified tariff concessions or other benefits which 
agricultural exporting countries expect to receive from the General Agreement • • • • 
These developments are of such a character that either they have weakened or threaten 
to weaken the operation of the General Agreement as an instrument for the promotion 
of mutually advantageous trade." GATT, TRADE IN AGRICULTIJRAL PRODUCTS 25 (1962). 
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tions or consumer preferences between national markets and such 
competitive considerations as cost disparities, are no more than 
mentioned, although they may often constitute substantial deter-
rents to international trade.2 
l. THE BACKGROUND 
With the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 19623 and 
the preparations thereafter initiated for further multilateral tariff 
negotiations pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade,4 the United States has continued its firm commitment to 
the belief that an expansion in the volume of international trade 
will promote its economic, political and social objectives, and will 
strengthen the alliance of free nations. President Kennedy char-
acterized the Trade Expansion Act as "the most important inter-
national piece of legislation . . . affecting economics since the 
passage of the Marshall Plan," and asserted that it "marks a 
decisive point for the future of our economy, for our relations 
with our friends and allies, and for the prospects of free institu-
tions and free societies everywhere."5 
One of the principal premises underlying the Trade Expansion 
Act has been its anticipated role in promoting the commercial 
export trade of the United States and thereby alleviating the 
international payments deficits that this country has experienced 
in recent years. President Kennedy described the act as "the pri-
2 The significance of these commercial factors is too self-evident to require docu-
mentation. For one typical summary, see statement by the Automobile Manufacturers 
Association, Hearings on R.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4080-83, 4087-88 (1962). The hearings contain numerous comparable 
examples. 
8 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1991 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
4 The United States became a party to the General Agreement pursuant to an 
executive agreement concluded by the president. Proclamation No. 2671A, 12 Fed. Reg. 
8863 (1947). Presidential action was based on authority delegated by the trade agreements 
legislation. 
5 47 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 655 (1962). More recently, Christian Herter, United States 
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, summarized the principal purposes of 
the act as follows: 
"To increase the security and well-being of the United States and the Free World 
through the expansion of trade, with the consequent benefits to industries and workers. 
"To strengthen Atlantic ties and enlarge the area of interdependence within an 
Atlantic Community and with industrialized countries such as Britain, Japan, Australia 
and Canada. 
"To stimulate the economic growth of the less developed nations by offering access 
to world markets for their products and encouraging commercial policies on their part 
which are conducive to their own development and to fruitful world trade." U.S. DEP'T 
OF COMMERCE, lNT'L COMMERCE 10-11 (Sept. 23, 1963). 
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mary long-term means" of reversing the recent decline in the 
commercial trade surplus and stated that it should "open new 
markets and widen existing markets for American exports."6 
Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, testifying in support 
of the bill, pointed out that an expansion in the export trade of 
the United States "has become an urgent national need."7 He 
reasoned: 
"If tariffs on our exports and imports are reduced to a com-
parable extent, the neutral assumption would be that exports 
and imports would rise by the same percentage. As a result, 
the American trade surplus would become larger. 
"Conditions now evident, and likely to persist for a num-
ber of years, make it more likely, however, that American 
exports to Western Europe would rise by a greater percent-
age than the exports of Western European countries to the 
United States."8 
There can be no question, in view of the recurring deficits in 
the United States balance of payments, that the expansion of com-
mercial exports must be an important and continuing objective 
of national policy. So long as our foreign dollar expenditures for 
programs of military and economic assistance remain at substan-
tial levels, a countervailing increase in the commercial trade sur-
plus would be clearly preferable to other, usually more restrictive, 
methods of reducing the payments deficit. 
To assist in achieving this objective, the executive branch in 
recent years has instituted a variety of programs designed to pro-
mote the commercial export trade of the United States. The Depart-
ment of Commerce has steadily expanded its activities in this 
fi.eld.9 In 1962, the President established within the Department 
the office of the National Export Expansion Coordinator for the 
purpose of correlating these activities with those of other depart-
ments and agencies as well as private organizations.10 These con-
6 President's Special Message on Balance of Payments, 109 CONG. REc. 12113 (daily ed. 
July 18, 1963). 
'T Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 816. 
8 Id. at 818. 
9 There is a voluminous literature describing the Department's export promotion 
activities. One brief summary appears in Commerce in 1961, 49 SEC. OF COMMERCE ANN. 
REP. 61-73 (1961). The President's Special Message on Balance of Payments, 109 CoNG. 
REc. 12113, 12114 (daily ed. July 18, 1963) notes that "the Department of Commerce 
has developed a broad program of education and assistance to present and potential 
American exporters.'' 
10 Draper Daniels, the first National Export Expansion Coordinator, was appointed July 
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tinuing programs have been supplemented from time to time by. 
additional means, such as the 1963 White House Conference on 
Export Expansion.11 Proposals have recently been made in Con-
gress for legislation to authorize a review of the entire export pro-
motion program and to establish a national advisory council on 
export policy and operation which would examine progress and 
make recommendations to the President in this area.12 
These efforts to expand the volume of commercial exports have 
undoubted value.13 But experience increasingly demonstrates that 
the effectiveness of export promotion programs and concomitant 
attempts to negotiate reciprocal tariff reductions can be substan-
tially vitiated in many instances by the presence of non-tariff re-
strictions that discriminate against imported goods. The Com-
mission of the European Economic Community has recently 
pointed out: 
"The Community must give increased attention to other in-
direct obstacles to the free movement of goods, which are 
becoming all the more conspicuous and critical as further 
progress is made in the abolition of customs duties and quotas 
properly so called."14 
Non-tariff trade barriers are not of recent origin. Their exist-
ence has long been recognized by businessmen, government 
officials, and commentators. They were discussed when the Trade 
Agreements Act was under consideration in 193415 and were cited 
20, 1962. For his description of the activities of his office, see Hearings on Small Business 
and Foreign Trade Before the House Select Committee on Small Business, 88th Cong., 
1st Sess. 153-79 (1963). Government departments and agencies concerned with export 
promotion include, in addition to the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
State, the Treasury Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Small Business 
Administration, the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, and 
the United States Information Agency. 
11 Held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 17-18, 1963. The conference has been followed 
by a series of regional "little White House conferences" throughout the United States. 
12 See S. 1614, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
18 It is probably impossible to arrive at any reliable quantitative measure of the 
extent to which exports have been increased by these promotion programs. Large firms 
which are already experienced in the export field are not likely to be significantly affected. 
Smaller firms, particularly those that are unfamiliar with the export market, have in 
many instances benefited substantially. A few illustrative figures appear in the statement 
of Draper Daniels, Hearings, supra note 10, at 153-79. 
14 Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community 
for the Second Stage 11 (Oct. 24, 1962). To the same effect, see EUROPEAN FREE TRADE 
AssocIATION 3d ANN. REP. 6 (1963), stating that "the progressive elimination of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions means that other obstacles to trade gain in relative importance." 
llS See testimony of Secretary of State Cordell Hull with respect to non-tariff import 
barriers, quoted in Organization for Trade Cooperation: Hearings on H.R. 5550 Before 
the House Committee on Ways and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1956). 
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. in the Randall Commission Report.16 More recently, they were 
extensively referred to during the hearings on the Trade Expan-
sion bill17 and were the subject of a 1961 staff study by a sub-
committee of the Joint Economic Committee.18 They have been 
discussed in the proceedings of many professional and business 
groups concerned with problems of international trade.19 
Despite wide recognition of the existence of these barriers, 
until recently there seemed to exist a tendency on the part of some 
government officials to discount their significance. Administration 
statements regarding the Trade Expansion Act have occasionally 
appeared to assume that a continuing policy of multinational tariff 
reductions will of itself be sufficient to permit the desired expan-
sion in the volume of international trade.20 The comment is fre-
quently made that restrictions other than tariffs have largely 
disappeared in the industrialized countries, at least insofar as non-
agricultural commodities are concerned. A recent assertion to 
this effect appears in the 1963 report of the President on the trade 
agreements program, which recognizes the continued existence 
of non-tariff import controls in many countries but concludes that 
"on the whole, industrial countries have few remaining restric-
tions except in the agricultural sector."21 
During hearings on the Trade Expansion bill, this attitude 
provoked considerable legislative criticism, which was by no means 
confined to opponents of the trade agreements program. A leader 
in the attempt to secure adequate recognition of the problems 
posed by non-tariff barriers was Representative Curtis of Missouri, 
16 COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS 44 (1954). 
17 Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2; Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate 
Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). Virtually every domestic industry 
testifying on the bill provided instances of non-tariff import barriers that it had en-
countered abroad. A number of importers' groups cited comparable restrictions existing 
in the United States. Characteristic of much of this testimony was the assertion by Paul 
Douglas, President of the Sulphur Export Corporation, that United States sulphur exports 
face "a veritable jungle of restrictions." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 1841. 
18 SUBCOMMITrEE ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 
87TH CONG., !ST SESS., TRADE REsTRAINTS IN THE WESTERN COMMUNITY (1961). 
19 For one recent example, see PROCEEDINGS, CONFERENCE ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TRADE 
AND INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 255, 258 (1963). 
20 See, e.g., the statement of Secretary Dillon quoted in text accompanying note 8 
supra. The hearings on the Trade Expansion Act contain numerous similar statements. 
21 PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (1963). The 
context suggests that the reference is to formal quantitative restrictions and licensing 
and exchange controls imposed primarily or entirely for balance of payment reasons. As 
thus limited, the statement is probably correct. It fails to mention, however, a wide range 
of other non-tariff restrictions, maintained by industrialized and less developed countries 
alike, that often substantially inhibit world trade. See part II infra. 
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who subsequently voted for the bill. To Representative Curtis 
and others, the bill appeared to be regarded by some administra-
tion officials primarily as a tariff measure rather than as a mech-
anism for dealing with all forms of trade restrictions. A character-
istic statement of his position appears in his comment to Under 
Secretary of State George Ball: 
"Tariffs probably are the most liberal of all the kinds of trade 
barriers. Yet, the President's message, your statement, and 
the statement yesterday [by Secretary of Commerce Hodges], 
are almost confined to this very narrow band of trade barriers 
which we call tariffs."22 
On a number of occasions during the hearings, administration 
spokesmen were asked to submit detailed information as to non-
tariff barriers currently existing abroad, particularly in Europe.28 
A considerable volume of this material was furnished. It re-
lated primarily to import licensing and exchange controls and 
direct quantitative restrictions in the form of quotas and embar-
goes, although various instances of surcharges, deposit require-
ments, internal taxes, and certain other restrictive techniques were 
also cited.24 
It seems fair to conclude that although the executive branch 
has kept well advised regarding formal restrictions of this type, it 
has-at least until recently-possessed considerably less detailed 
information concerning the informal restrictions that often result 
from foreign administrative and private practices. Information of 
this nature is, of course, most readily available to United States 
businessmen who encounter such obstacles in seeking to sell a-
broad. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Department of Com-
merce, which has primary responsibility for the export promotion 
program, could perform a potentially valuable service by under-
taking further efforts to collect such data from the business com-
munity and other sources. The information could be used both to 
assist prospective exporters and to advise our GATT representatives 
22 Hearings, supra note 2, at 651. To the same effect see id. at 273-74. Earlier in the 
testimony, Secretary Hodges had suggested to Representative Byrnes that the problem of 
non-tariff barriers "is not as bad as you intimate" and had stated that "we are making 
tremendous progress in getting the nations of the world, particularly the important 
industrialized nations of the world, to cut down and cut out their restrictions." Id. at 
161-62. 
23 See, e.g., id. at 650-51, where Representative Curtis asked for "an exhaustive list" 
of past and current restrictions. There are numerous additional instances. 
24 Ibid. See especially 162-231, 480-600. The Department of Commerce also supplied 
a "Sample List of Nontariff Barriers to Trade.'' Id. at 274-76. 
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as to restrictions which they should seek to persuade other nations 
to remove.25 
Despite the diversity of views expressed by business spokesmen 
concerning the merits of the Trade Expansion Act, they have 
generally agreed that it is not likely to be successful in expanding 
commercial exports unless adequate measures are taken to remove 
the non-tariff, and particularly the informal, import restrictions 
which domestic firms have frequently encountered abroad.26 Vari-
ous amendments for this purpose were included in the bill in the 
course of legislative review.27 The conduct of the 1964 GATT nego-
tiations will furnish an indication of the extent to which the 
United States is prepared to exercise these statutory mechanisms, 
and of the extent to which restrictions of this nature are capable 
of being dealt with by such means. 
II. THE PRINCIPAL CATEGORIES OF NON-TARIFF IMPORT 
RESTRICTIONS 
It is obviously impracticable to attempt to enumerate all of the 
various forms of non-tariff import barriers. Their possible number 
is subject only to the limitations of human ingenuity. They may, 
however, be conveniently classified into categories according to 
their nature, their purpose, or the source from which they arise. 
For present purposes, a further distinction exists between overt 
and "hidden" barriers as it affects both the ease with which they 
may be identified and the probable effectiveness of attempts to 
remove them. 
The most readily identifiable types of non-tariff import restric-
tions are those which are formally imposed by national govern-
25 It should be noted that in 1962 and 1963 the Department, primarily through the 
Business and Defense Services Administration, has held informal meetings with a number 
of industries largely for the purpose of obtaining this type of information. In addition, 
it has recently circulated a questionnaire to the business community seeking further data 
concerning such restrictions. It is to be hoped that these inquiries will prove sufficiently 
productive to warrant an expansion of the Department's efforts. 
The Role of the Trade Information Committee should also be recognized in this 
regard. A primary objective of the Committee during its recent hearings in preparation 
for the 1964 tariff negotiations has been to collect evidence concerning foreign non-tariff 
import restrictions. See text accompanying notes 125-26 infra. 
26 See, e.g., the statement of Clarence Higbee, representing the Import Committee 
of the Wire and Cable Division of the National Electrical Manufacturers Association, 
Hearings on R.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 2414-16. Mr. Higbee urged that the bill should 
provide adequate assurance "that the executive branch will actively seek the elimination 
of foreign restrictions" other than tariffs, and stated that "the administration's trade 
proposals cannot be effective in promoting the export trade of the United States" unless 
such restrictions are removed. 
27 See part III infra. 
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ments to regulate the entry of goods. They include quantitative 
restrictions, mixing and tying restrictions, import licensing con-
trols, foreign exchange controls, deposits required of importers, for-
mal customs provisions, and customs levies other than tariffs. Inter-
governmental commodity agreements, at least to the extent that 
their purpose is to protect competing industries within the import-
ing country, may also be included in this category. In addition to 
these formal import controls, there also exist numerous informal 
types of restrictions which are considerably more difficult to iden-
tify. They result from customs administration and procedure and 
from the administration of the formal import controls. Finally, there 
exist certain other types of restrictions which are unrelated to the 
entry of goods as such; these include government procurement poli-
cies, internal tax policies, subsidy programs which accord an advan-
tage to domestic industries, and various private practices. 
These methods by which imports may be controlled should be 
distinguished from the purposes motivating the restrictions. The 
latter include protection of the national security, relief of injury 
caused by trade concessions, conservation of foreign exchange, 
encouragement of domestic industries, protection of public health, 
safety or morals, prevention of unfair competitive practices, and 
various other objectives which may be as numerous as the prob-
lems from which they arise. This distinction has considerable sig-
nificance, since the availability and efficacy of legal and diplomatic 
procedures to remove such restrictions will depend both on their 
nature and on the reasons for their imposition. 
A. Formal Restrictions on the Entry of Goods 
I. Formal Quantitative Restrictions 
In a sense, all government import controls other than tariffs, 
other customs levies, and deposit requirements can be considered 
quantitative restrictions, since they operate directly by limiting 
the volume of imports rather than indirectly by interposing the 
economic deterrent of increased cost. Nevertheless, because formal 
quantitative restrictions present distinguishable problems of iden-
tification and removal, it is convenient to consider them separately. 
The principal types of formal quantitative restrictions are 
quotas and embargoes, the latter in effect being quotas which are 
set at a level of zero import units.28 They may be imposed either 
28 It is apparent that a tariff can itself have the effect of an embargo if the rate is 
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on a single product or on a group of related products. Quotas may 
apply to all such imports collectively, regardless of origin, in 
which case they are generally termed "global," or they may allocate 
a specific quantity or proportion of the total quota to each country 
of origin. In the l~tter case, a common criterion of allocation is 
the amount supplied by each such country during a prior base 
period. The maximum number of units to be permitted entry 
under a quota may be absolute, in the sense that this figure may 
not be exceeded during the quota period. In some instances, how-
ever, such as the current German quota on coal, imports are per-
mitted above the quota maximum but are subjected to a higher 
rate of duty which is frequently designed to render them noncom-
petitive in the importing market. This form of restriction is gen-
erally termed a "tariff quota." 
Quota levels may be established by a variety of methods. The 
simplest procedure is to specify the maximum number of units 
that will be permitted entry under the quota during a fixed 
period. Some quotas utilize more complicated formulae based on 
the level of domestic demand, anticipated domestic production, or 
various other criteria.29 
Following World War II, most industrialized nations except 
the United States employed quotas in conjunction with import 
licensing controls, exchange restrictions, and other techniques, as 
a means of conserving scarce foreign exchange during the period 
of reconstruction. As their domestic economies developed, these 
controls have been gradually relaxed. They remain prevalent, 
however, in the less developed countries. 
2. Mixing and Tying Requirements 
Mixing requirements specify that not less than a designated 
proportion of the components of processed goods must be of 
sufficiently high. See, e.g., data supplied by the Sulphur Export Corporation with respect 
to sulphur tariffs in Mexico and certain other foreign countries, which it characterized 
as "so high as to represent a complete embargo." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, 
at 1841. 
29 The United States quota on petroleum imports illustrates the potential complexity 
of these formulae. The United States is divided for quota purposes into five districts 
(Puerto Rico constitutes an additional district) and petroleum imports are divided into 
three categories-crude and unfinished oils, finished petroleum products, and residual 
fuel oil for use as fuel. The maximum level of imports of each category of products in 
each district is determined by various interrelated formulae based on a composite of 
domestic demand, the level of imports during various prior base years, and the proportion 
of total imports supplied by various categories and subcategories of these products. The 
allocation of import licenses among importers is determined by a related set of formulae. 
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domestic origin. While such requirements characteristically apply 
to agricultural products (for example, the requirement that bread 
processed in the importing country must contain at least a speci-
fied proportion of domestic wheat fl.our), they are capable of being 
applied to certain types of non-agricultural commodities. 
Tying requirements condition the importation of a commodity 
upon a commitment by the importer (or the foreign supplier or 
exporter) to provide a market for a specified quantity of another 
commodity which the importing country wishes to sell. In the 
typical case, the tied commodity is one that has not been moving 
successfully in ordinary trade. Usually, although not always, the 
commitment must be to sell in the export market. Tying require-
ments are characteristically found among the less developed na-
tions, such as those of Latin America. 
Both of these forms of restriction can seriously inhibit imports. 
Mixing requirements may be c9mpared with quotas based on a 
proportion of domestic production. Tying requirements can be 
even more restrictive. Since the tied commodity is likely to be diffi-
cult to sell profitably, and since its market may not be familiar 
to the party required to give the commitment, the effect may be 
to discourage the transaction altogether. 
3. Import Licensing Controls 
One of the most flexible and effective methods of restricting 
international trade is to require that imports be licensed in ad-
vance by the government of the importing country. It is apparent 
that by making licenses easier or more difficult to obtain, the gov-
ernment can regulate the volume of imports of any commodity 
at will.30 It is also apparent that the regulation can be accom-
plished either by establishing formal criteria governing the issu-
ance of licenses or--often more simply and effectively-by causing 
issuance to depend on ad hoc administrative determinations. 
Licensing requirements today are most prevalent in the less 
developed countries, where they are frequently coupled with 
exchange controls.31 Together, they often comprise a more serious 
80 Import licensing controls are thus effective substitutes for formal quotas or 
embargoes, and may be less readily identifiable. The Sulphur Export Corporation has 
asserted that "one of the most flagrant examples of nontariff discrimination is the 
current policy of the Japanese Government of absolutely prohibiting any imports of 
crude elemental sulphur by refusing to issue import licenses." Hearings on H.R. 9900, 
supra note 2, at 1842. The Japanese appear to have relaxed these restrictions somewhat 
in recent months. 
81 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 19, at 157. 
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deterrent to imports than any other restrictions imposed by those 
oountries.82 Even among the industrialized nations, however, some 
licensing requirements still remain. The Commission of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community has recently stated: 
"The elimination of quantitative restrictions has not neces-
sarily dispensed importers and exporters from the obligation 
of obtaining licenses. The administrative procedure for issu-
ing these is often extremely cumbersome, involving prolonged 
delays or even genuine impediments especially in cases of econ-
omic hardship or sensitive products. Hence, even where licenses 
are issued automatically, the licensing system is not in practice 
always compatible with the free movement of goods in the 
Common Market and should therefore be abolished."88 
Licensing controls are frequently used, either in addition to 
or in lieu of exchange controls, as a method of alleviating inter-
national payments deficits. Another common purpose, at least in 
the less developed countries, is to encourage the growth of domes-
tic industries. In Mexico, for example, the original objective of 
licensing controls was primarily to conserve foreign exchange for 
essential uses. The system now increasingly appears to be admin-
istered as a means of protecting local industries. Two of the prin-
cipal criteria for evaluating a license application are whether 
domestic sources of supply are adequate and whether the proposed 
import transaction would adversely affect competition in the do-
mestic market. 84 
4. Exchange Controls 
Since international trade depends upon the adequate availa-
bility of foreign exchange on reasonable terms, the manner in 
which exchange controls are applied can sharply affect the volume 
of imports. There are many forms of such controls, including 
general restrictions on current payments, multiple currency prac-
82 "[M]ost free trade advocates recognize that in many areas, such as Latin America, 
the chief barrier to increased trade is not high tariffs, but complex and discriminatory 
non-tariff import and exchange control regulations." Id. at 255. 
88 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 14. 
84 Import licensing controls in many countries are even more directly designed to 
protect domestic industries. As an example, a license is required in Venezuela to import 
any commodity of a kind produced by a local industry which the government desires to 
encourage. Normally, licenses for such commodities will be issued only to the extent 
that the domestic demand may be expected to exceed domestic supply. It is indicative of 
the underlying purpose of the restrictions that license applications are typically made not 
to officials concerned with foreign trade but rather to the Ministry of Development. 
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tices, preferential regional treatment, and bilateral payments 
arrangements. 
The improvement in the payments and reserves position of the 
industrialized countries of Western Europe has led to a general 
relaxation of their exchange controls. A similar trend has been 
evident in Japan, although that country incurred a marked pay-
ments deficit in 1961 which was not reversed until early in 1962. 
Controls remain common in the less developed nations, many of 
which have substantial and continuing payments deficits as well 
as serious internal economic problems.35 
Practices common throughout Latin America illustrate the 
exchange control difficulties faced by importers located in less 
developed regions who seek to do business with United States 
firms. Bilateral payments arrangements among Latin American 
countries, although less prevalent than in the past, are still en-
countered. Member countries of the Latin American Free Trade 
Association frequently accord reciprocal exchange control prefer-
ences which are not available to imports from other sources. 
Moreover, multiple exchange rates exist in many countries.36 
5. Prior Deposits 
In a number of countries, importers are required to deposit 
with the government a specified sum in order to obtain the license 
or certificate of exchange cover which · is a precondition of the 
import transaction. The deposit requirement may thus be viewed 
as one element either of the country's exchange controls or of its 
licensing controls. In its effect, however, it constitutes an additional 
and frequently substantial obstacle to the transaction. 
The extent to which this requirement may inhibit trade de-
pends upon both the amount and the period of the deposit. The 
amount is usually proportionate to the value of the proposed 
85 For a recent review of exchange restrictions by country, see INT'L MONETARY FuND 
14TH ANN, REP. ON EXCHANGE REsnuCTIONS pt. 2 (1963). 
86 In Brazil, for example, two foreign exchange categories are used. Commodities 
considered essential, and virtually all commodities from the other members of the Latin 
American Free Trade Association, are included in the "general category." All other 
commodities appear in the "special category." Importers of articles in both categories 
must contract in advance for foreign exchange, but importers of special category items 
must also obtain an import license. For this purpose, it is first necessary to obtain a 
"promise of license." These promises are made available at public auction by the Super-
intendency of Money and Credit. Because the amount of foreign exchange available for 
special category imports is restricted by the government, the prices of promises to license 
are ordinarily bid up to a level which effectively discourages the importation of these 
items. 
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import, the proportion often depending on the nature of the 
commodity. Imports considered essential to the domestic economy 
may be exempted from the deposit requirement, while luxury 
goods may be subject to a deposit so prohibitive as to constitute a 
virtual embargo.37 
The period of the deposit is usually the same irrespective of 
the nature of the commodity involved. It may represent a serious 
deterrent to an importer who lacks sufficient financial resources 
to permit him to tie up funds for this length of time. Moreover, 
a long deposit period is an additional obstacle in countries where 
inflation has caused high interest rates, thus materially increasing 
the total cost of the import transaction. Conditions in Brazil, 
where the cruzeiro has become drastically devalued and annual 
interest rates are often in the range of thirty to forty percent, illus-
trate the extent to which domestic inflation may aggravate the 
burden imposed by deposit requirements. 
6. Formal Customs Provisions 
In addition to the tariff schedules themselves, there are certain 
formal provisions of the customs laws that may restrict imports. 
Among the most important are procedural formalities and methods 
of valuation. Customs formalities, if disproportionate to the 
necessary processing of the transaction, theoretically can constitute 
a substantial barrier to imports. It may be doubted, however, 
whether this type of impediment (as contrasted, for example, with 
delay in issuing import licenses, which appears to be a relatively 
common and effective device in some countries) has in fact been 
a major deterrent to trade in recent years. The various efforts 
which are currently being made to reduce and standardize customs 
formalities are primarily designed to simplify and facilitate import 
transactions which would probably occur in any event.88 
By contrast, the valuation provisions of the customs laws may 
87 In Chile, for example, deposit requirements frequently amount to as much as 
200% of the value of the proposed import, and in rare cases reach 10,000%. In Brazil, the 
deposit amounts to 200% in the case of all special category imports and 100% to 200% 
in the case of commodities in the general category. Certain commodities considered 
essential to the Brazilian economy are exempted from deposit requirements. 
88 Unnecessary customs formalities may, of course, be a considerable nuisance in 
import transactions, and attempts to eliminate them are to be commended. The Com• 
mission of the European Economic Community, for example, has taken cognizance of 
"all the administrative checks carried out when frontiers are crossed" and has commented 
that "for the efficient working of the Common Market and doing away with physical 
frontier checks within a reasonable period, these administrative obstacles to trade must 
also be abolished." Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 14. 
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have a considerable influence on the volume of trade. In the 
United States, for example, legislation was adopted in 1956 which 
altered the basis of valuation in a number of respects. These 
changes have been regarded as slightly reducing the extent of 
protection afforded by the tariff schedules, although the tariffs 
themselves remained unchanged.39 Their' effect would have been 
considerably greater if the new act had not specifically provided 
that items subject to a reduction in duty of five percent or more 
as a result of the new provisions would continue to be valued 
under the old act. The Treasury Department, having found that 
the reduction would have amounted to as much as thirty or forty 
percent in the case of some commodity groups, thereupon issued 
a "final list" of articles for which the prior methods of valuation 
were to be maintained.40 
Another example of the manner in which customs valuation 
provisions may affect international trade is afforded by the current 
controversy over "American selling price." Under both the Tariff 
Act of 1930 and the Customs Simplification Act of 1956, certain 
commodities have been valued for duty purposes on the basis of 
the United States price of the comparable commodity produced in 
this country.41 The effect of this method of valuation is to increase 
substantially the dutiable value of many commodities to which it 
so The valuation provisions of the Tariff Act of 1930 were originally contained in 
§ 402, 46 Stat. 708 (1930). The Customs Simplification Act of 1956, 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. 
§ 1401a (1958), redesignated § 402 as § 402a and enacted a new § 402 containing the 
revised basis of valuation. Briefly, the 1956 act eliminated "foreign value" as the 
principal basis of valuation and adopted "export value" in its stead. "United States 
value" and "constructed value" (formerly "cost of production") were continued as 
alternative bases of valuation, subject to certain modifications. "American selling price" 
was also retained, similarly modified, in the case of certain classes of commodities. 
As noted in the te.xt, the application of these changes was subject to the Treasury 
Department's designation of articles to be included in the "final list" required by § 6(a) 
of the 1956 act, for which the prior ,methods of valuation were to be continued. The 
final list is reprinted in BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, U.S. TREAS. DEP'T, EXPORTING TO THE UNITED 
STATFS 70 (Dec. 1962). For a general discussion of the changes introduced by the 1956 act, 
see id. at 14-17. 
40 Although the final list was necessary in 1956 to prevent the change in valuation 
methods from producing unintended alterations in the dutiable value of a number of 
commodities, its continuance to the present time has been criticized by commentators. 
See, e.g., MAssoN & ,VHITELY, BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
27-30 (1960). The authors state that "Congress was so impressed with the protective effects 
of the old valuation procedures that in enacting the change it provided for certain 
commodities to be e.xempted from the new definitions .•.. For the time being, then, the 
United States is operating on a dual valuation system, with old, more ambiguous and more 
protective standards applicable to one group of commodities, and a modernized set of 
standards applicable to all other dutiable imports." Id. at 29. 
41 For the definition of American selling price, see the Tariff Act of 1930, § 402(e), 
46 Stat. 708, 19 U.S.C. § 1402(e) (1958), as amended by the Customs Simplification Act 
of 1956, 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 1401a (1958). 
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applies. Since coal tar products are primarily affected, the provision 
has been extensively criticized by foreign chemical firms. It has 
been defended with equal vigor, however, by the United States 
chemical industry.42 
7. Customs Levies Other Than Normal Tariffs 
Tariffs are by no means the only customs charges applicable to 
imported commodities. In many foreign countries additional levies 
exist. They are most frequently referred to as surcharges, import 
taxes, or supplementary taxes, although other terms are occa-
sionally used. Although they are prevalent in the less developed 
countries, many industrialized nations also employ them.43 
A similar form of customs levy, particularly common in the less 
developed countries, is the luxury tax. Despite its name, this tax 
is frequently applied not only to luxuries (which the importing 
country presumably does not produce but feels it can do without) 
but also to commodities which the country does produce and 
which it wishes to insulate from foreign competition. The luxury 
tax is often imposed in addition to both the tariff and the sur-
charge. 
The cumulative effect of these levies can be formidable. In 
Chile, for example, there exists a normal ad valorem or specific 
tariff, an "additional tax" which is typically thirty percent of the 
42 For a recent statement of the position of foreign chemical manufacturers, see 
Chem. & Eng'r News, Oct. 28, 1963, p. 26, reporting the attitude of the German Verband 
der Chemischen Industrie. The association strongly objects to the continuation of the 
American selling price provision and urges that the matter be considered at the 1964 
negotiations pursuant to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. To the same 
effect is a recent speech by Dr. Victor M. Umbricht, President of CIBA North American, 
at a Briefing Conference on Tariffs and Other Barriers to European-American Trade, 
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8-9, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Briefing Conference]. Dr. Umbricht 
maintains that the use of American selling price as a basis of valuation may raise the 
effective rate of duty to as much as two or three times the level that would otherwise 
e.xist. 
The position of the United States chemical industry in support of the American selling 
price method of valuation is conveniently summarized in SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEM. MFRS. 
Ass'N OF THE UNITED STATES, THE CASE FOR AMERICAN SELLING PRICE (Nov. 1963). 
43 For examples, see Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2; Hearings on H.R. 11970, 
supra note 17. Many of these examples are found in the industrialized countries, 
particularly in Western Europe. The United States industry has recently protested an 
Italian "import equalization tax" on television receivers which is asserted to raise total 
customs charges from 20% (the normal duty) to over 31%. See J. Commerce, June 18, 1963. 
It may be noted that prior to the recent adoption of revised tariff schedules pursuant 
to the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 72, 19 U.S.C. § 168 (Supp. IV, 1963) the 
United States imposed certain import taxes under the INTERNAL REvENuE ConE OF 1954. 
These have been incorporated in the revised tariff schedules in the form of specific duties, 
and the corresponding sections of the Code repealed. 
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duty-paid value, a luxury tax of thirty-two percent on luxury 
items, and a temporary surcharge of up to 200 percent. Articles 
subject to all or most of these charges face a major import barrier.44 
In some instances, surcharges have been adopted for the pur-
pose of alleviating a payments deficit rather than protecting domes-
tic industries. This is true of the temporary Chilean surcharge 
referred to above. The recent action by Canada provides another 
illustration of the use of this technique. In mid-1962, the Canadian 
Government, concerned over the nation's international payments 
situation, imposed temporary import surcharges ranging from five 
to fifteen percent.45 As the Canadian payments position sub-
sequently improved, these charges were withdrawn. 
In addition to the foregoing levies, it is normal for countries 
to impose various customs fees. In theory, and usually in practice, 
these fees are solely for the purpose of recouping expenses incur-
red in processing the import transaction. They are, therefore, too 
minor to deter trade. In a few instances, however, they have been 
set at levels disproportionate to the expense involved, with the 
effect of creating an additional import barrier. 
Finally, it should be noted that ordinary tariffs may be imposed 
in a manner that creates restrictions in addition to those inherent 
in tariff schedules of general applicability. Preferences created by 
. customs unions and free trade areas provide an illustration. The 
Commonwealth preference system constitutes a somewhat com-
parable case. Canada, for example, maintains a three-column tariff 
schedule, consisting of a Commonwealth preference rate, a most-
favored-nation rate, and a general rate which is of slight signifi-
cance today. The Commonwealth preference rate on many items 
is appreciably lower than the most-favored-nation rate. As in the 
case of regional trading arrangements, the result of the Common-
wealth preference is to accord a competitive advantage to favored 
suppliers at the expense of outsiders. 
44 Chile is by no means an isolated case. A measure of the magnitude of the barrier 
that can be presented by these additional duties is afforded by the customs treatment 
of imports in Argentina. A new, unified tariff schedule has recently been adopted which 
largely retains the restrictive character of the previous system of cumulative levies. Under 
the new schedule, duties range up to 320% of C.I.F. value. The former supplementary 
surcharge of 5% continues to be imposed on most items as a temporary measure (it is 
scheduled to be terminated on Oct. I, 1964). 
45 For detail, and a copy of the Order in Council adopting the surcharges, see 
Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 17, at 1768-1834. The Canadian action required a 
waiver under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which was subsequently 
obtained. 
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8. Intergovernmental Commodity Agreements 
One further type of formal governmental restriction on imports 
requires brief mention. Unlike the controls discussed above, it 
consists of multilateral rather than unilateral governmental action. 
Although the mechanics of these intergovernmental agreements 
differ, each of them is designed to regulate the availability in inter-
national trade of the commodity to which it relates. 
Insofar as the underlying motivation is concerned, there are 
two distinct categories of commodity agreements: those in which 
the principal objective is to assist producers and the producing 
countries, and those in which the objective is to protect competing 
domestic industries within the consuming countries. Agreements 
such as those relating to tin, wheat, sugar, and coffee are detailed 
documents which provide elaborate procedures intended to assure 
the producers of these commodities that they will receive adequate 
and relatively stable prices in world markets.46 By contrast, the 
current textile agreement is designed to restrict cotton textile im-
ports into the United States for the protection of the domestic 
textile industry.47 
Intergovernmental commodity agreements of the former type 
tend to reflect in general the interests of the principal parties. Pro-
ducing countries approve them because of the benefits to their 
domestic economies. Consuming countries are motivated by a 
variety of considerations, not the least of which is a desire to in-
crease the economic and political stability of the producing coun-
tries. Agreements of the second type, however, are beneficial 
principally to competing industries within the consuming coun-
tries. Such agreements are accepted by the producing countries 
largely because they foresee that refusal to do so is likely to cause 
the consuming countries to impose unilateral controls which might 
be both more restrictive and less amenable to subsequent modifica-
tion than the terms of the agreement. 
46 See, e.g., International Wheat Agreement 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4302; International 
Sugar Agreement 1959, T.I.A.S. No. 4389. 
47 The Long Term Arrangement Regarding Trade in Cotton Textiles was concluded 
at Geneva on Feb. 9, 1962. By the beginning of 1963, it had been accepted by 22 
countries. It followed an interim arrangement for the same purpose which became 
effective Oct. 1, 1961 for a one-year period. The Long Term Arrangement is implemented 
in the United States by Exec. Order No. 11052, 27 Fed. Reg. 9691 (1962), which delegated 
to the President's Cabinet Textile Advisory Committee the responsibility for supervising 
the administration of the Arrangement and for negotiating the bilateral agreements 
contemplated thereby. For a summary of the role of the Contracting Parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in concluding the Arrangement, see, e.g., 
PRESIDENT'S 6TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 9, 72 (1962); PRESIDENT'S 
7TH ANN. REP., op. cit. supra note 21, at 7. 
1964] NoN-TARIFF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 1313 
For these reasons, agreements of the second type have been 
criticized on the ground that they are the equivalent of unilaterally 
imposed quotas, but are more objectionable because they are not 
subject to the limitations provided in existing trade agreements 
legislation.48 Nevertheless, a number of industries in the United 
States have urged that such arrangements be concluded to protect 
their interests.40 Similar suggestions have been made by the Euro-
pean Economic Community50 and the European Coal and Steel 
Community.51 
B. Administrative Restrictions on the Entry of Goods 
Each of the formal restrictions referred to above must neces-
sarily be effectuated through administrative procedures. These 
procedures afford opportunities for imposing restrictions on im-
ports in addition to those inherent in the formal controls. Certain 
examples, such as the use of licensing or exchange controls to 
exclude imports of commodities produced domestically, have been 
suggested in the previous discussion. 
The potentially restrictive effects of administrative procedures 
may be illustrated by reference to customs classification and valu-
ation.112 In general, it may be said that the opportunity to create 
administrative barriers to trade is implicit in every aspect of the 
48 For an example of such criticism, see Separate Views of the Republicans on H.R. 
11970, H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1962). 
49 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 17, at 1767, 1838 (softwood lumber). 
The Administration has indicated a willingness to discuss softwood lumber imports with 
the Canadian Government. Id. at 1835. See also Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 2, at 
1842 (sulphur). 
110 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 14, at 75. The Commission states 
that "in order to establish a common point of view for the Community, the Commission 
took an active part in the negotiations for the cotton textile arrangement and, if the 
arrangement works satisfactorily in practice, intends to propose that the same method be 
used for other products." 
111 The Council of Ministers of the ECSC is considering action to protect steel pro• 
ducers within the Community from the increasing volume of steel imports. One possible 
long-term solution reported to be under consideration is an intergovernmental commodity 
agreement for steel. Wall Street J., Nov. 4, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. 
112 See the classic comment of B. A. Levett: "Let me write the Administrative Act and 
I care not who fixes the rates of duty." LEvErr, THROUGH THE CUSTOMS MAZE 11 (1923). 
Recent commentators on trade between the United States and Canada have stated: "It 
is no exaggeration to say that valuation and classification practices alone could easily be 
manipulated to exclude almost any dutiable import from the United States or Canada." 
MASSON &: ENGLISH, INVISIBLE TRADE BARRIERS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 1 
(1963). PROCEEDINGS, op. cit. supra note 19, calls attention to the significance of the 
classification of proposed imports as "essential" or "non-essential" in some Latin American 
countries and notes that "a change in classification from essential to non-essential can be 
ruinous to an exporter who has developed the market and established a working distribu-
tion system." Id. at 260. ·while these classifications are often made within the framework 
of statute or regulation, they -may nonetheless represent the exercise of ad hoc adminis• 
trative discretion with respect to specific cases. 
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classification and valuation provisions which entail the exercise 
of discretion. There are many such instances in the customs laws 
of every country. 
The significance of classification procedures is reflected in the 
fact that the recent promulgation of the revised tariff schedules 
of the United States was preceded by a series of hearings intended 
to ensure that the adoption of the new classification would not 
alter applicable rates of duty.53 A few of the more significant prob-
lems relating to classification may be summarized for illustrative 
purposes. 
Composition: Many tariff classifications depend upon whether 
the article in question is "wholly," "in chief part," or "in part" 
composed of certain materials. The difference in the possible rates 
of duty may be substantial. When the article contains a number 
of different components, the proportions of which may differ 
depending upon whether they are based on value, weight, volume 
or some other unit of measure, classification may entail consider-
able administrative discretion. When the unit of measure is value, 
fluctuations in the prices of the components may further compli-
cate the determination. 
Component parts: This is a different problem from that of 
determining the composition of an article. Many items are subject 
to different rates of duty depending upon whether they are clas-
sified as component parts or as separate items. Experienced 
exporters are accustomed to ship composite articles either assem-
bled or in their separate components, according to which proce-
dure results in the lower total duty. 
End use: In a number of countries, the ultimate use of the 
article may be an important factor in establishing its classification 
for duty purposes. One common criterion is whether the article 
is intended to become a component in domestic manufacture. If 
so, the applicable duty is often substantially reduced. The uncer-
tainty of distinguishing between identical imports on the basis of 
their eventual use is apparent.54 
Origin: This is an important criterion of classification in the 
tariff schedules of most countries. It is necessary to determine 
whether most-favored-nation or Commonwealth preference rates 
58 The revision does not appear to have altered significantly the average level of duties, 
although some individual items have been affected. It resulted in sufficient changes, 
however, to require the United States to enter into negotiations with other countries to 
provide compensatory concessions in some instances. 
54 One objective of the recent tariff revision in the United States was to eliminate, 
insofar as possible, the reference to ultimate use as a criterion of classification. 
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apply. Determination of origin may present difficulties when 
the article contains components from different sources or when it 
has been produced or processed in more than one country. In 
certain countries, for example, an article cannot qualify for prefer-
ential tariff treatment under the country-of-origin provisions 
unless it has been shipped directly to the port of entry. 
Valuation, like classification, frequently entails the exercise of 
administrative discretion. Under United States law, for example, 
the determination of export value, United States value, or con-
structed value requires a decision as to what constitutes "such or 
similar merchandise" to be used as the basis for valuing the 
imported article.55 Furthermore, customs officials must decide 
whether the preferred basis of valuation can be "determined satis-
factorily" in order to establish which basis to apply.56 Various 
additional decisions must be made, such as whether the merchan-
dise to be used as the basis for valuation is "freely sold or, in the 
absence of sales, offered for sale," whether it is sold or offered "to 
all purchasers at wholesale" or, if to selected purchasers, whether 
"in the ordinary course of trade ... at a price which fairly reflects 
the market value of the merchandise," and whether it is sold or 
offered in "the usual wholesale quantities."57 When constructed 
value is used, numerous accounting determinations must be made. 
These examples serve to indicate the extent to which the 
classification and valuation provisions of the customs laws of any 
country entail the exercise of administrative discretion.58 It is not 
suggested that in the great majority of instances this discretion 
is exercised in other than a conscientious and equitable fashion. 
Nevertheless, the provisions afford a continuing opportunity to 
impose additional restrictions against imported articles, either 
deliberately or by inadvertence. In such circumstances, the diffi-
1111 See Customs Simplification Act of 1956, §§ 402(b)-(d), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 140la(b)-(d) (1958). 
56 Customs Simplification Act of 1956, § 402(a), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. § 140la(a) (1958). 
117 Customs Simplification Act of 1956, §§ 402(b)-(d), (f), 70 Stat. 943, 19 U.S.C. 
§§ 140la(b)-(d), (f) (1958). The same problems are involved in determining American selling 
price under § 402(e). 
118 A useful discussion of these administrative techniques and other forms of trade 
barriers as employed in the United States and Canada is contained in MAssoN &: ENGLISH, 
op. cit. supra note 52; MAssoN &: WHITELY, op. cit. supra note 40; and SOUTHWORTH &: 
BUCHANAN, CHANGES IN TRADE RESnucrroNS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
(1960). For additional information on administrative techniques in Canada, see relevant 
portions of ARTHUR ANDERSEN &: Co., TAX AND TRADE GUIDE: CANADA (1963); CANADIAN 
IMPERIAL BOARD OF COMMERCE, DOING BUSINESS IN CANADA (1961). Administrative barriers 
in the customs laws of the United States are discussed in HUMPHREY, AMERICAN IMPORTS 
188-207 (1955). 
1316 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
culty of detecting the discrimination contributes materially to its 
effectiveness. 
C. National Policies Underlying Restrictions on the Entry of 
Goods 
The preceding discussion has sought to illustrate the principal 
non-tariff methods, both formal and administrative, by which 
national governments may limit the entry of commodities in inter-
national trade. It has been suggested that these techniques should 
be distinguished from the purposes motivating the restrictions. 
This is necessary not only for conceptual clarity but also because 
both law and diplomatic practice take cognizance of the purpose 
as well as the method of restriction in assessing its propriety. 
No useful purpose would be served by attempting to enu-
merate all of the possible reasons for which the importation of 
goods may be controlled by governments. A wide range of political, 
economic and other motivations are conceivable. As a background 
for the consideration of legal remedies, however, it is desirable 
to summarize the principal purposes for which restrictions are 
most commonly imposed. 
I. Protection of National Security 
It is widely recognized that nations may regulate the importa-
tion of commodities that threaten their essential security inter-
ests. 59 The form of the domestic legal authority for such action 
differs in different countries. In the United States, specific legis-
lation for this purpose has been in effect since 1954.60 Its scope was 
successively expanded in 1955 and 1958.61 It currently appears as 
section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.62 
59 See, e.g., the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XXl(b). 
60 Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 360; subsequently Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1955, § 7, 69 Stat. 166; and Trade Agreements Extension Act 
of 1958, § 8, 72 Stat. 678. 
61 In its original form, the national security provision was quite limited. It merely 
provided that "no action shall be taken pursuant to [the Trade Agreements Act] to 
decrease the duty on any article if the President finds that such reduction would threaten 
domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements." Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1954, § 2, 68 Stat. 360. 
In 1955, this authority was substantially extended by directing the President to "take 
such action as he deems necessary to adjust the imports of such article to a level that will 
not threaten to impair the national security." Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 
§ 7, 69 Stat. 166. A procedure was provided by which the question was to be investigated 
by the Office of Defense Mobilization and recommendations made to the President. 
The 1958 amendment sought to clarify the criteria to be considered by the executive 
branch in evaluating the effect of imports on the national security. It also introduced 
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Section 232 prohibits the granting of a trade concession on 
imports of any article when the President finds that the concession 
would threaten to impair the national security. It establishes a 
procedure for investigating the national security implications of 
imports of any article and directs the President, unless he con-
cludes that a threat to the national security does not exist, to 
"take such action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to 
adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that such 
imports will not so threaten to impair the national security."63 
Various investigative criteria are enumerated in the act, including 
domestic production necessary for defense purposes, the current 
and anticipated capacity of the domestic economy to meet such 
requirements, and the effect of imports on the foregoing.64 
The executive branch has recognized that such restrictions 
may be required in certain instances.65 Nevertheless, although 
various changes in language which were viewed as rendering the provision more pro-
tective. See, e.g., the requirement that the President, on receipt of an affirmative finding 
from the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization, must take restrictive action "unless" 
he found that imports "do not" threaten the national security. The 1955 act had directed 
such action only "if" he found such a threat. For discussion of the implications of this 
change, see S. REP. No. 1838, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1958). Representative Mills took the 
view that the amendment did not materially alter the effect of the national security 
provision, since final determination remained with the President. See 104 CoNG. REC. 
16542 (Aug. 7, 1958). 
A number of additional changes were adopted in 1958 which provoked controversy, 
both in and out of Congress, as to the proper objectives of the national security pro-
vision. It was widely agreed that, within reasonable limits, domestic industries directly 
essential to the national defense are legitimate and necessary subjects of protection. But 
the attempt to determine the point at which the economic condition of an individual 
industry is related to the welfare of the domestic economy as a whole, and the extent to 
which either consideration falls properly within the ambit of the national security pro-
visions, engendered strongly divergent views. In this connection, the House Ways and 
Means Committee stated: 
"Your Committee was guided by the view that the national security amendment is 
not an alternative to the means afforded by the escape clause for providing industries 
which believe themselves injured a second court in which to seek relief. Its purpose 
is a different one .... Serious injury to a particular industry, which is the principal 
consideration in the escape-clause procedure, may also be a consideration bearing 
on the national security position in particular cases, but the avoidance or remedy 
of injury to industries is not the object per se." H.R. REP. No. 1761, 85th Cong., 
2d Sess. 13 (1958). 
62 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 232 is substantively identical 
with § 8 of the 1958 act. H.R. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1962). The 
administration had originally proposed a procedural change, of conjectural practical 
significance, by which the President would himself conduct the requisite investigation. 
This proposal was deleted from the act as subsequently adopted. 
63 Section 232(b), 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
64 Section 232(c), 76 Stat. 877, 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
61:i See, e.g., testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric: 
"I would want to see certain safeguards. That is why I refer to the importance of 
section 232. We must always have in mind the importance of maintaining our own 
"I think interdependence is important, but I always want to have, right here at 
defense industry in this country. 
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nearly forty applications have been filed for relief under the na-
tional security provision, affirmative action has been taken only 
in the case of petroleum imports. These restrictions, in the form 
of import quotas, were imposed March IO, 1959,66 and continue 
in effect today.67 They follow a series of investigations and recom-
mendations by various governmental bodies and a program of 
voluntary restrictions which was in effect during 1958.68 
2. Relief of Injury Caused by Trade Concessions 
A second widely recognized ground for restricting imports is 
to relieve injury to a domestic industry resulting from trade con-
cessions previously granted. In an attempt to ensure that controls 
of this nature will be invoked only in appropriate instances, na-
tions have sought to define in general terms the criteria justifying 
their use.69 In the United States, this "escape clause" procedure70 
has been embodied in legislation since 1951.71 Successive amend-
ments, generally designed to facilitate the obtaining of relief, cul-
minated in the Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1958.72 The 
1962 act contains further revisions, 73 the net effect of which is 
probably to make relief somewhat more difficult to obtain. 
Only a relatively small proportion of applications for relief 
under the escape clause have been successful. During the period 
from 1948 to 1962, prior to the passage of the Trade Expansion 
home, an industrial base which we can look to for our support of our Military 
Establishment. 
"I do not think the two are inconsistent. I think they are supplementary." 
Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and .Means, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 762 (1962). 
66 Presidential Proclamation No. 3279, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959). The proclamation 
has been modified by a succession of subsequent directives. 
67 For a simplified summary of the mechanics of the quota, see note 29 supra. 
68 A history of these controls and a description of their present operation is contained 
in a speech by J. Cordell Moore, Administrator, Oil Import Administration, Department 
of the Interior, at Briefing Conference. 
69 See the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XIX. 
70 Technically, escape clause relief has been redesignated "tariff adjustment" under 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The old term is so well entrenched by usage, however, 
that it will probably continue to be employed. In the present discussion, use of the older 
term is to be taken as referring to the procedure under either the 1962 or earlier acts, as 
the context indicates. 
71 See Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 73. Prior to 1951, the 
President by executive order had specified the procedures by which the Tariff Com-
mission was to administer the escape clause. 
'12 72 Stat. 675 (1958). 
73 As noted above, the escape clause appears in the 1962 act under the title of tariff 
adjustment. The mechanism by which tariff adjustment operates is distributed through 
§§ 301, 302, and 351 of the act. The substantive criteria by which the Tariff Commission 
is to evaluate an application for relief appear in § 30l(b). 
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Act, 135 applications were filed with the Tariff Commission. Of 
these, thirty-two were subsequently dismissed or withdrawn. In the 
remaining 103 cases, the Tariff Commission found no injury in 
fifty-eight. Relief was denied by the President in twenty-six cases 
and granted in fifteen. Four were still pending at the beginning 
of 1963, in all of which the Commission has subsequently found 
no injury under the criteria established by the 1962 act.74 
3. Prevention of Unfair Competitive Practices 
A number of international trading practices have generally 
been regarded as forms of unfair competition. Insofar as these prac-
tices are relevant to a discussion of import restrictions, they include 
the sale of goods in the import market at prices below those ob-
tained in the home market, 75 patent, copyright or trademark 
infringement by imported goods, failure to identify the country 
of origin, use of convict or forced labor in the manufacture of 
imported goods, and similar techniques. While there is general 
agreement that these practices are objectionable and may properly 
be prevented,76 they nevertheless afford occasional opportunities 
for restricting imports which may not in fact compete unfairly 
with domestic goods. 
In the United States, the most general provision relating to 
unfair import competition is section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
as amended.77 It prohibits "unfair methods of competition and 
unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States" 
where the "effect or tendency ... is to destroy or substantially 
injure" a domestic industry or to restrain or monopolize United 
States commerce. Final decision is made by the President following 
an investigation by the Tariff Commission, the remedy for viola-
74 Data are taken from MASSON & ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 52, at 29. 
711 Probably tbe most comprehensive discussion of tbis practice, known as "dumping," 
is contained in VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (1923). Most 
countries accord relief where dumping results in injury to a domestic industry. It has 
occasionally been suggested, however, tbat tbe practice is objectionable only when 
accompanied by a predatory intent. By contrast, tbe Secretariat of tbe European Free 
Trade Association suggests tbat, although dumping is classified by tbe Stockholm Con-
vention as a rule of competition, "it is legitimate to regard it as more like an escape 
clause tban as part of a code of behavior." See SECRETARIAT OF THE EUROPEAN FREE TRADE 
Ass'N, STOCKHOLM CONVENTION EXAMINED 42 Gan, 1963). 
76 See, e.g., tbe General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. VI, XX(d)•(e). 
Comparable provisions are found in international conventions establishing tbe various 
regional trading arrangements among nations. 
77 46 Stat. 703, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1958). The predecessor of § 337 is § 316 
of tbe Tariff Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 943. 
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tion being denial of entry. Most of the proceedings brought under 
this provision have involved patent or trademark infringement.78 
Imports of patented, trademarked or copyrighted articles can 
also be hindered by the absence or inadequate enforcement of 
laws designed to prevent infringement within the importing coun-
try. During hearings on the Trade Expansion Act, Senator Javits 
proposed an amendment (which was not adopted) which would 
have specified that "infringements of U.S. patents, copyrights, and 
registered trademarks will be considered as actions unjustifiably 
restricting U.S. commerce and as cause for retaliatory measures 
by the United States."79 
Identification of marks of origin is enforced under section 304 
of the Tariff Act of 1930.80 Although exceptions to marking re-
quirements are permitted under specified circumstances, there 
have been examples of the application of these requirements 
which appear to have imposed an undue burden on importers.81 
Articles produced by convict or forced labor are prohibited 
importation by section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.82 An excep-
tion is permitted in situations in which the domestic supply of 
such articles is inadequate. 
The sale of imported goods at prices below those prevailing 
in the country of origin is prohibited in many countries by anti-
dumping laws.83 The numerous adjustments necessary to arrive 
at a valid comparison between the price of an article in the import-
ing market and in the home market will necessarily entail, in 
complex cases, the frequent exercise of administrative discretion. 
Particularly troublesome problems relate to the treatment of 
quantity discounts in the importing market when the article is 
not sold in comparable quantities in the home market84 and to the 
78 It may be observed that the copyright laws severely curtail protection to works 
published abroad and subsequently imported into this country. Copyright Act § 1, 61 
Stat. 652 (1947), as amended, 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). 
79 Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th Cong., 2d 
..Sess. 1288 (1962). Senator Javits asserted that "infringements of U.S. patents and other 
- rights have demonstrably interfered with our ability to export .... " Ibid. 
so 46 Stat. 687, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1958). The Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 
§§ 42, 43, 60 Stat. 440, 441, 15 U.S.C. §§ II24, ll25 (1958) prohibit marking which mis-
represents the origin or nature of imported articles. 
81 See, e.g., MAssoN & WHITELY, op. cit. supra note 40, at 33-34. 
82 46 Stat. 689, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1958). 
83 See generally the Antidumping Act of 1921, 42 Stat. ll-15 (1930), as amended, 19 
U.S.C. §§ 160-69 (1958). Dumping laws in a number of other countries have roughly the 
same effect, although they differ considerably as to procedure and in some instances as 
to the criteria applied. In Canada, for example, the dumping duty is applied if the goods 
are of a class or kind made in that country, without inquiry as to injury. 
84 In Canada, an extra discount may not be allowed for valuation purposes where 
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allocation of various selling expenses between the two markets. 
Moreover, fluctuations in prices or rates of exchange during the 
period under review can create additional complications. 
When there are insufficient sales to permit valid price com-
parisons, administrative discretion is frequently required in deter-
mining costs of production, particularly where accounting methods 
differ. In countries in which injury is a prerequisite to the imposi-
tion of dumping duties, difficult questions arise concerning the 
identification of the relevant domestic industry ( either geographi-
cally or in terms of product lines), the presence or absence of 
predatory intent and its significance, the extent, if any, to which 
the price of the imported article is less than the domestic price, 
the volume of imports and their probable duration, the nature 
and extent of the adverse effects on the domestic industry and 
similar problems. 85 
4. Protection of Public Health, Safety and Morals 
Import regulations of this character are universally recognized 
among nations. Their general purpose is unexceptionable. They 
may relate to standards of identity, quality, and purity for food-
stuffs, labelling of medicines and potentially harmful substances, 
quarantine and inspection of plants and animals, registration or 
exclusion of dangerous articles, and similar matters. These regu-
lations are sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade86 and by regional trading arrangements among nations. 87 
Controls of this type have, however, occasionally been employed 
to impose additional administrative burdens on imports which 
may not in fact constitute a threat to health, safety, or morals. 
Attempts which have been made to simplify and harmonize such 
restrictions reflect an awareness of this potential abuse of a legiti-
mate regulatory power.88 • 
imported goods are sold in larger quantities than in the home market, whereas sales in 
unusually small quantities will be credited with a smaller discount than exists in the 
home market. See MAssoN &: ENGLISH, op. cit. supra note 52, at 12. 
85 For a useful discussion, see background material for speech by James Pomeroy 
Hendrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, at Briefing Conference. This 
material also contains a summary of Treasury Department actions in antidumping 
proceedings since the act was adopted in 1921. 
86 Art. XX(a), (b). 
87 See, e.g., Stockholm Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Ass'n arL 
12; Montevideo Treaty Establishing the Latin American Free Trade Ass'n art. 53. 
88 See Memorandum of the Commission on the Action Programme of the Community 
for the Second Stage 15 (Oct. 24, 1962) urging harmonization of these provisions or in 
some instances their codification in a single European body of regulations. See also art. 12 
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5. Other Common Objectives of Restrictions on the Entry of 
Goods 
It has been suggested in connection with the previous reference 
to exchange controls that the conservation of scarce foreign ex-
change is a frequent objective of import restrictions. Another 
purpose that has been mentioned is the encouragement of domes-
tic industries by insulating them from foreign competition. 
Restrictions of both types are prevalent in, although not limited 
to, the less developed nations. There is evidence that restrictions 
in favor of domestic industries may be increasing in those areas. 89 
D. Non-Tariff Import Barriers Other Than Restrictions on Entry 
In addition to restrictions on entry, there exist a variety of 
other techniques, both governmental and private, by which im-
ports may be placed at a competitive disadvantage or excluded 
altogether. Prospective exporters have frequently found these 
methods to be at least as restrictive as those previously discussed. 
They may be generally classified as discriminatory practices relat-
ing to government procurement, taxes ( either national or local) 
other than import levies, and programs of government subsidy. 
In addition, import restrictions may result from private action. 
I. Government Procurement Policies 
It is common practice for governments to give preference to 
domestic industries in the award of public contracts. In some in-
of the Stockholm Convention, providing that these restrictions as therein authorized 
shall not be used "as a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
Member States or as a disguised restriction on trade between Member States ••.• " 
89 The PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 10 (1963) 
comments that "restrictions in less developed countries have become increasingly wide• 
spread on imports for which substitutes are available from local production." For 
examples from industrialized countries, see SOUTHWORTH & BucHANAN, op. cit. supra note 
58, at 32, citing instances in which Canadian tariff classification depends on whether the 
imported article is of a "class or kind made in Canada" (a lower duty being assessed if 
it is not). See also testimony by William R. Hewlett with respect to H.R. 9900: "Most 
of the equipment that we manufacture is classified by the United Kingdom as equipment 
that may enter duty free if there is no comparable product in the United Kingdom. If, 
however, such a product is available from local sources, then our product carries a 
33¾ percent tariff." Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 2206. 
The Commonwealth preference system constitutes a form of restriction in favor of 
Commonwealth industry, both in manufacturing the final product and-through the 
Commonwealth content requirements-in supplying the component parts. By allowing 
preferential rates of duty only on articles of Commonwealth origin, and by specifying 
that to qualify under this criterion the article must have not less than a prescribed 
Commonwealth content, the preference system encourages Commonwealth manufacturers 
t~ use local materials insofar as possible. See, e.g., Armstrong, How Canadian Exports 
Can. Enjoy British Preference, INDUSTRIAL CANADA 47-51 (Sept. 1963). 
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stances, this policy is embodied in legislation; in others, it results 
from administrative action.90 Particularly in the case of industries 
in which the government is a major customer, "buy national" 
policies can greatly restrict purchases from foreign suppliers. The 
Commission of the European Economic Community has recently 
commented: 
"Entrepreneurs and their products, in quite a number of 
cases concerning the award of public contracts, still have to 
contend with extra formalities if not actual discrimination 
in other Member States. Since the public sector takes such 
a large slice of the national product, these practices consti-
tute no mean obstacle to freedom of trade."91 
Restrictive government purchasing policies have various mo-
tivations. They may result from the same desire to encourage the 
development of domestic industry that was previously mentioned 
in connection with restrictions on the entry of goods, or they may 
be attributable to a concern for the country's international pay-
ments position.92 They may also reflect a desire to protect domestic 
industries irrespective of their stage of development.93 Character-
istically, these policies derive from a combination of motives. 
It follows that restrictions on government procurement are not 
confined to less developed countries. Indeed, their prevalence 
90 Compare, for example, the operation of the Buy American Act, 47 Stat. 1520 (1933), 
41 U.S.C. § IO(a)-(c) (1958), as implemented by Exec. Order No. 10582, 19 Fed. Reg. 8723 
(1954) in the United States, with the informal administrative policy employed in 
Canada. Both appear to constitute effective deterrents to imports in many industries. 
(It should be noted that, for purposes of defense procurement, the United States has 
waived the applicability of the Buy American Act under certain circumstances with 
respect to specified articles.) 
91 Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 88, at 15. For one listing of restrictive 
government procurement practices in Western Europe and the United States, see testimony 
of Seymour Graubard with respect to H.R. 9900, Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 
65, at 3590-92. 
92 The United States Government has recently taken a renewed interest in the applica-
tion of the Buy American Act, particularly in the field of defense procurement, because 
of continued concern regarding the payments deficit. There is also a recent article in 
Nihon Keizai Shimbun (Sept. 24, 1963) announcing the decision of the Japanese Govern-
ment "to institute a new policy to have Ministries and other governmental agencies give 
priority to purchases of domestically-made products as part of its program to preserve 
the nation's international payments balance." A special agency is to be established within 
the Prime Minister's Office "to encourage the use of domestically-made products by 
governmental organs." 
98 See, for example, the announcement on July 26, 1962, of a governmental program 
to aid the United States softwood lumber industry. The program includes "the establish• 
ment of a preference for American products in the purchase of lumber by the Department 
of Defense, the General Services Administration and other Federal departments and 
agencies [which) could be particularly significant in connection with the various 
aspects of the AID program." Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 79, at 1835. 
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among industrialized nations constitutes an important obstacle to 
the effectiveness of multilateral tariff reductions in expanding 
the volume of international trade. An example of foreign purchas-
ing restrictions is provided by the experience of the United States 
electrical wire and cable industry. Official procurement policies 
are particularly significant in that industry since foreign govern-
ments and government purchasing agencies frequently constitute 
the principal customers for many types of wire and cable. The 
industry has recently stated: 
"[W]e have been refused permission to submit bids, or even 
to obtain specifications, in the case of bids solicited by the 
purchasing agents of a number of foreign governments. We 
have also found that foreign governments make use of 'grand-
father' clauses and similar techniques to preclude bids by 
United States wire and cable companies. In addition, in-
stances have occurred in which a foreign government has 
sought the advice of the local wire and cable industry in 
determining whether a United States company should be al-
lowed to submit a bid to that government, and has accepted 
the recommendation of its industry that the United States 
company not be permitted to bid. In some instances, bid 
requests from foreign government agencies require the bid-
der to show the percentage of proposed manufacture within 
the territory of that government, and expressly state that con-
sideration will be given to this information in evaluating 
the bid."94 
As the foregoing quotation suggests, restrictive procurement 
policies may be applied not only in the case of purchases made 
directly by governments, but also in those situations in which 
procurement is conducted through government purchasing organi-
zations of various types. One of the problems faced by the United 
States coal industry, for example, in seeking to develop an export 
market in France, is the procurement policy of the Association 
Technique !'Importation Charbonniere. The ATIC is a public 
corporation which is the only authorized importer of coal from 
sources outside the European Coal and Steel Community, and its 
operations are subject to the coal import policies of .the French 
Government. Sales to the United Kingdom are similarly discour-
aged by the purchasing policies of the National Coal Board.911 
94 Statement of the Import Committee of the Wire and Cable Division of the 
National Electrical Manufacturers Association Before the United States Tariff Commis-
sion (March 6, 1964). 
95 A general discussion of barriers to United States coal exports is contained in 
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Restrictive procurement practices are not limited to national 
governments. In a number of countries, local governments impose 
comparable barriers to imports either· from outside national 
boundaries or, in some instances, from outside the local jurisdic-
tion. An illustration of the latter form of restriction is afforded 
by the recent Canadian controversy over "buy provincial" prac-
tices. One Canadian observer has remarked that "the growing 
trend in Canada to give local suppliers and contractors special 
preference when awarding government and even private business 
contracts is producing what amounts to an internal 'tariff' struc-
ture ... .''96 
2. Taxes Other Than Import Levies 
Internal taxes that apply equally to domestic and imported 
articles are ordinarily not discriminatory per se, even though they 
are based on duty-paid value in the case of an import. In such 
instances, it is the duty, not the tax, that causes the absolute 
amount of the tax to be higher on the imported than on the do-
mestic product.97 There are, however, internal taxes which, while 
on their face nondiscriminatory, are in fact discriminatory because 
ROBERT R. NATHAN AssocIATES, THE FOREIGN POTENTIAL FOR UNITED STATES CoAL, REP. 
TO THE DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, OFFICE OF COAL REsEARCH (1963) [hereinafter cited as 
NATHAN REP.]. 
06 Financial Post (Oct. 19, 1963). The article cites the following as examples: 
"Some local authorities are paying premiums of as much as lOo/o-15% to local 
suppliers. 
"Quebec has spelled out in some detail a policy of favoring Quebec manufacturers 
and other business firms. 
"Many other provinces are following similar policies, although they are frequently 
less explicit in setting out the rules. 
"Even municipalities in some areas make it difficult for outside suppliers to win 
municipal contracts." 
07 The fact that the tax, in absolute terms, is higher on the imported article may of 
course adversely affect its competitive position. Where the imported article is priced 
sufficiently below the comparable domestic article to enable it to reach a different price 
market, the application of a relatively large internal tax to both articles may dispropor• 
tionately injure the competitive position of the import by increasing its price to the 
point where it cannot retain its former market. Such a tax would not, however, con-
travene art. III, para. 2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as interpreted by 
its supplementary provisions. 
It should be observed that whereas in the United States tax revenues derive principally 
from income taxes, with state and local sales taxes generally at very low levels, the 
revenues of European countries depend to a much greater extent on sales and similar 
taxes. In a number of such countries, sales or turnover taxes may amount to 25%. Where 
the amount of the tariff is appreciable, a sales tax of this magnitude applied to the 
duty-paid value of the imported article may considerably increase its total cost. The 
foregoing effect is magnified where more than one turnover tax is imposed. The Com-
mission of the European Economic Community is studying means of abolishing the 
so-called "cascade" tax on gross turnover, Memorandum of the Commission, supra note 
88, at 25. 
1326 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
of the manner of their incidence. Taxes of this nature may con-
stitute serious deterrents to prospective exporters and importers. 
The hearings on the Trade Expansion Act have publicized 
one of the classic examples of discriminatory internal taxation. 
This is the annual use or road tax which exists in some European 
countries. France and Italy provide the best-known instances. In 
neither case is the tax discriminatory in form, since its ostensible 
objective is proper and it applies to all vehicles irrespective of 
origin. The discrimination consists in the sharply disproportionate 
increase in the levy on automobiles above a certain horsepower. 
In France, for example, the tax on automobiles of low "fiscal 
horsepower" is nominal, the annual rate on sixteen horsepower 
being only thirty dollars. Above sixteen horsepower, however, the 
rate on new automobiles begins at 203 dollars.98 The adverse effect 
on imports of larger American cars is obvious. 
3. Subsidy Programs and Price Controls 
Virtually all governments provide economic assistance in some 
degree to particular domestic industries. The forms that these 
benefits can take are as numerous as the purposes for which they 
may be provided. They include not only outright grants but also 
various forms of tax benefits, preferential treatment in the admin-
istration of loan programs, administration of procurement and 
stockpiling programs, minimum price regulations, and a wide 
variety of other techniques.99 These benefits are relevant to the 
present discussion to the extent that they may constitute a form of 
discrimination against imported goods. In a sense, any subsidy 
that assists a domestic industry can be so considered, since it 
strengthens pro tanto the competitive position of the domestic 
article relative to that of its imported counterpart. This is true 
whether or not the subsidy is designed as a form of protection 
against import competition. In Canada, for example, the subven-
tions paid on the transportation of domestic coal have recently 
been calculated to average more than five dollars per ton.100 This 
is a considerably more significant obstacle to sales of United States 
coal in Canada than the tariff of fifty cents per ton on bituminous 
coal imports. 
98 See statement of American Automobile Manufacturers Association, Hearings on 
R.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 4089. 
99 For an indication of the possible scope of subsidy programs, see JOINT ECONOMIC 
COMM., 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDYLIKE PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
(1960). 
100 NATHAN REP. vol. I, ch. VII, at 4. 
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Some types of benefits are specifically designed to assist domes-
tic industries against foreign competition. In France, both the 
wholesale and the retail price of coal imported from countries 
outside the European Coal and Steel Community is regulated to 
prevent it from underselling domestic coal.101 These controls ef-
fectively deprive United States coal of the price advantage it 
would otherwise possess in the French market. A different form 
of assistance is provided by the maritime subsidy program in the 
United States. To protect the domestic shipbuilding industry, a 
construction-differential subsidy is authorized under the Merchant 
Marine Act of 1936102 to compensate for the difference between 
domestic and foreign shipbuilding costs. To assist the ship opera-
tors, the act also authorizes an operating-differential subsidy103 to 
compensate for higher operating costs. To qualify for these bene-
fits, the United State operator must, inter alia, agree to use 
domestic materials and supplies and to have his vessel repaired 
in the United States. Both of these subsidies have the effect of 
depriving foreign shipyards and materials suppliers of the price 
advantages which they could otherwise offer in competing for 
business in the United States. 
4. Private Practices 
In addition to the various restrictions resulting from govern-
mental policies and programs, import barriers may result from 
private action. A common instance is the preference of many 
consumers for goods of national origin. This preference, which 
is understandably encouraged by domestic suppliers,104 may range 
from outright refusal to purchase foreign articles when the do-
mestic counterpart is available, to the more common case in which 
the consumer will buy domestically unless a significant price di£-
101 Id. ch. VI, at 22. The Report also notes that because of governmental price and 
subsidization programs, "the price at which coal is marketed in France, whether of 
imported or indigenous origin, does not reflect true cost relationships.'' Vol. III, annex 
D, at 142. 
The Report concludes that "subsidies are likely to be used increasingly as a means of 
protecting indigenous coal production, which would negate the effect of reduced import 
barriers. An approach to the problem that did not take this into account would be 
futile.'' Vol. I, ch. X, at 24. 
102 49 Stat. 1995-2001, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-61 (Supp. IV, 1963). See generally 
SUBSIDY AND SUBSIDYLIKE PROGRAMS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, op. cit. supra note 99, at 
39-48. 
103 49 Stat. 2001-08, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1171-82 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
104 A typical example is the "Buy Canadian-Make Canadian-Sell Canadian" 
promotion program conducted by the Canadian Manufacturers' Association. See IN-
DUSTIUAL CANADA, op. cit. supra note 89, at 64. 
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ferential or other advantage exists in favor of the foreign article. 
The extent of this national preference obviously varies widely 
among individual consumers. Since it is affected by the relation-
ship between the consumer an& his domestic supplier, it tends to 
be more prevalent in commercial transactions than among retail 
customers.105 
Cartel and other concerted business practices are probably the 
most widely recognized instances of private action that may re-
strict the importation of goods. The European Economic Com-
munity and similar regional bodies have given considerable at-
tention to these arrangements, lest they impair the progress being 
made in reducing other forms of trade restraints. There is a 
corresponding risk that such arrangements may tend to vitiate the 
effects of tariff reductions. 
The most familiar form of cartel restriction consists of an 
international undertaking among suppliers not to sell in each 
others' markets. The obligation may be absolute, or it may take 
the form of an agreed quota or a requirement of prior concurrence 
by suppliers located within the market in question. United States 
firms which have sought to expand their export markets have 
found that concerted practices among their foreign competitors 
can also comprise a serious deterrent. Joint pricing and marketing 
policies on the part of such competitors can make entry into their 
market substantially more difficult. A potentially more serious 
impediment is the occasional practice by which foreign suppliers, 
acting in concert, designate their members in rotation to undersell 
the imported article. 
Ocean freight rates established by private international ship-
ping conferences are also an important factor in international 
trade. Not only is the level of rates significant in determining th!:! 
profitability of export shipments, but disparities between rate 
levels may benefit one group of exporters at the expense of another. 
Considerable attention has recently been directed to differences 
between eastbound and westbound rates on Atlantic crossings, 
which are frequently to the disadvantage of United States ex-
porters.106 Comparisons of freight rates charged for shipments 
from the United States and from Europe to various Asian, African 
105 Articles of foreign origin, such as British woolens or Italian shoes, are, of course, 
frequently at a premium in the retail industries. 
106 Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Balance of Payments, Hearings 
Before the Joint Economic Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
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and Latin American destinations have provided a more direct 
measure of this competitive disadvantage.107 
E. Effect of Non-Tariff Barriers on the Volume of International 
Trade 
It is hazardous to attempt any quantitative assessment of the 
extent to which the foregoing restrictions may have reduced the 
volume of international trade. Where they have resulted in an 
embargo or a quota of known dimensions, a rough estimate of 
their effect may be obtained by calculating the volume of trade 
that would have occurred in the absence of such restrictions. Where 
they are less readily identifiable and the extent of their application 
is less certain, it becomes virtually impossible to arrive at any 
reliable quantitative conclusion. There can be no doubt, however, 
that their cumulative effect is substantial.1°8 
As suggested at the outset of this discussion, the policy ob-
jectives of the United States and the continuing concern regard-
ing the balance of payments deficit require that increased attention 
be given to means of reducing foreign non-tariff import barriers. 
107 Sec statement by Robert C. Clark, Vice-President, FMC International, id. at 307. 
Mr. Clark reported that for seven chemical commodities studied, the average rate from 
Europe to third country destinations was $1.54 per 100 lbs., as contrasted with $2.33 in 
the case of shipments from the United States to the same destinations. Concern over the 
rate disadvantage to which United States exporters are subject has prompted the 
Administration to suggest that, unless the disparities can be removed by other means, 
legislative remedy may be required. See President's Special Message on Balance of 
Payments, 109 CONG. REc. 12113 (daily ed. July 18, 1963). 
Shipowners have agreed that eastbound rates are often higher than westbound rates 
and that rates from the United States to third countries may exceed those over comparable 
distances from foreign ports. They maintain, however, that this circumstance results not 
from discriminatory intent but rather from competitive factors. Among the latter they 
cite higher stevedoring and port charges in the United States. They also assert that the 
prevailing smaller volume of non-bulk dry cargoes in shipments to the United States 
must be compensated by somewhat higher rates on comparable outbound shipments. 
See, e.g., 37 !NT'L TRADE REv. 86 (1963). 
108 MASSON &: WHITELY, BARRIERS TO TRADE BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 
65 (1960) comment that "these 'invisible' barriers are multitudinous, and make their 
effects felt in a variety of ways." The authors attempt some general conclusions as to 
the effects of United States import barriers on Canadian industrial raw materials and 
fuels (id. at 72-76) and manufactured intermediate products and consumers' goods (id. at 
76-82). The effects of Canadian barriers on selected categories of United States exports 
are considered id. at 83-95. 
The Nathan Report estimates that by 1970 United States coal exports could be 
increased by as much as 250% over the 1962 level, "depending largely on the extent to 
which the foreign nations relax their barriers to the entry of imported coal and other 
protective measures for their coal industries." NATHAN REP. vol. I, ch. I, at I. The 
Sulphur Export Corporation has noted that "the countries restricting imports from the 
United States in one way or another account for 50 percent of the sulfur consumed 
outside of the United States, but they take only 25 percent of our exports, whereas those 
countries not restricting United States imports account for 75 percent of our exports." 
Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 65, at 1843. 
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Unless this can be done, the benefits which this country has hoped 
to derive from its export expansion program and from the 1964 
round of multilateral tariff negotiations are in danger of being 
materially diminished. It is therefore relevant to · examine the 
authority that exists for this purpose in the domestic law of the 
United States, and to attempt to form an estimate of the extent 
to which these remedial provisions may become effective instru-
ments of national policy. 
III. THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE IN THE DOMESTIC LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES 
Legislative provisions relating to non-tariff import restrictions 
maintained by foreign nations are of two general types. The first 
includes statutory authority to negotiate with other countries con-
cerning the existence and removal of these barriers. It also includes 
the administrative procedures established to bring them to the 
attention of United States government officials, to process com-
plaints by domestic firms which consider their export trade 
adversely affected, and to conduct the negotiations intended. to 
remove them. The second category comprises the substantive 
authority to deal with such restrictions, either by offering induce-
ments to their removal or by threatening retaliatory action. 
A. Negotiating Authority and Procedures for Dealing with Non-
Tariff Import Restrictions 
I. Authority To Negotiate 
The authority of the President to negotiate with foreign na-
tions concerning non-tariff trade barriers has long been recognized 
by statute.109 The Dingley Tariff Act of 1897 contained the first 
explicit delegation of authority to enter into agreements for the 
purpose of terminating discriminatory treatment of United States 
exports. 110 Agreements concluded by the executive branch pur-
109 Because the statutory basis of the President's authority is clear, no consideration 
is given to the constitutional question as to the extent of the authority that would exist 
in the absence of legislative delegation. It should be recognized, however, that the inherent 
authority of the President to conduct the actual negotiations with foreign nations is 
beyond dispute. This power exists irrespective of delegation, since it derives directly from 
the Constitution. As stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
319 (1936): 
"In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold 
problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of 
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he 
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it." 
110 Section 3, 30 Stat. 203-04 (1897). 
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suant to that act related to a variety of foreign restrictive devices 
other than tariffs.111 
This authority has been part of the trade agreements program 
since its inception. Section 350(a)(l) of the Tariff Act of 1930, 
as amended, authorized the President 
"For the purpose of expanding foreign markets for the 
products of the United States ... whenever he finds as a fact 
that any existing duties or other import restrictions ... are 
unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the 
United States ... to enter into foreign trade agreements with 
foreign governments or instrumentalities thereof . . . ."112 
The express statutory reference to non-tariff import restric-
tions was the deliberate consequence of congressional concern that 
such obstacles might otherwise vitiate the benefits of tariff con-
cessions obtained from foreign nations. During legislative hearings 
on the Trade Agreements Act, much testimony had been presented 
concerning the existence of these restrictions. Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, among others, stated that in view of their prevalence 
and variety, the statute should provide explicit authority to 
negotiate concerning them.113 The House Ways and Means Com-
mittee, in its report on the bill, pointed out that it was specifically 
drafted to include reference to import restrictions other than 
tariffs.114 
The present statutory authority to enter into trade agreements 
with foreign nations appears in section 20l(a) of the Trade Ex-
111 For examples, see Principal Legal Questions Raised Relating to H.R. 5550, 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Dep't of State, Hearings on H.R. 5550 Before the House 
Committee on JVays and Means, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-80 (1956). The memorandum 
also cites instances of such agreements concluded prior to 1897 pursuant to the Tariff 
Act of 1890, which sought to terminate "unequal and unreasonable treatment of American 
exports." Section 3, 26 Stat. 612 (1890). The 1890 act contained no express agreement-
making authority. 
112 48 Stat. 943 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1351(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). (Emphasis 
added.) 
113 Hearings on H.R. 5550, supra note 111, at 67. 
114 Ibid. The language of the Ways and Means Committee was quoted in the report 
of the Senate Finance Committee. 
The constitutionality of the delegation of agreement-making authority is solidly 
established. In Hampton &: Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928), the Supreme Court 
upheld the provision of the Tariff Act of 1922 which delegated wide discretion to the 
President to adjust tariffs in order to equalize foreign and domestic costs of production. 
See also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), sustaining the validity of certain discretionary 
provisions of the Tariff Act of 1890. In Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 47 C.C.P .A. 
(Customs) 52 (1959), it was held that the delegation of agreement-making authority under 
the trade agreements program is constitutional. 
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pansion Act of 1962.115 As originally drafted, this authority was to 
be exercised "in order to further the purposes" of the act.116 Un-
like section 350(a)(l) of the 1930 act, no express reference was 
made to foreign non-tariff restrictions, although one of the objec-
tives of the act was stated to be the expansion of United States 
export markets "by lowering trade barriers."117 An analysis of 
the bill prepared by the executive branch explained that despite 
the change in language, which was designed to make the requisite 
presidential finding less formal, the new provision was "based 
largely" on section 350(a)(l). 
As finally enacted, the language of section 20l(a) closely re-
sembles that of the prior legislation and continues the explicit 
reference to foreign non-tariff import restrictions. It provides: 
"Whenever the President determines that any existing 
duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country ... 
are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the 
United States and that any of the purposes stated in section 
102 [including stimulation of the domestic economy, enlarge-
ment of export markets, and strengthening of economic rela-
tions with free-world nations "through the development of 
open and nondiscriminatory trading"] will be promoted 
thereby, the President may . . . enter into trade agreements 
with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof .... " 
(Emphasis added.) 
As in the case of the previous trade agreements legislation, 
therefore, permission to negotiate for the removal of foreign import 
restrictions other than tariffs is clearly delegated in the basic 
trade agreements authority of the 1962 act. An implicit confirma-
tion of this authority appears in the statement of purposes, which 
refers not only to the maintenance and enlargement of United 
States markets but also to the achievement of "open and nondis-
criminatory trading." 
It may also be observed that the 1962 act, like its predecessors, 
requires the President to submit annual reports to Congress 
on the operation of the trade agreements program. Section 402 
specifies that these reports shall include information as to "the 
results of action taken to obtain removal of foreign trade restric-
tions (including discriminatory restrictions) against United States 
115 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
116 H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
117 Id. § 102. 
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exports, remaining restrictions, and the measures available to seek 
their removal in accordance with the purposes of this Act ... .''118 
This language would seem plainly to contemplate presidential 
authority to negotiate with foreign nations in seeking the elimina-
tion of such restrictions. 
The existence of authority to negotiate concerning foreign non-
tariff barriers does not necessarily define its scope. Part II above 
describes a wide range of such restrictions. Some of these may be 
maintained by local as readily as by national governments, while 
some are attributable wholly to private action. These restrictions 
result from a diversity of motives. It has been occasionally sug-
gested that certain of these classes of restrictions may be beyond 
the ambit of the President's statutory negotiating authority. 
The 1962 act, continuing almost verbatim the language of the 
prior trade agreements legislation, defines the phrase "other import 
restriction" to include any "limitation, prohibition, charge, and 
exaction other than duty, imposed on importation or imposed for 
the regulation of imports."119 This language seems adequate to 
reach any form of restriction imposed at the time of importation, 
although it might be questioned whether arbitrary customs classi-
fication and valuation methods are strictly describable as "limita-
tions, prohibitions, charges or exactions." In regard to restrictions 
imposed after the time of entry, however, the language is perhaps 
not as unqualified as could be desired, since it might suggest that 
in order to be included within the definition the restriction must 
have the primary objective of regulation, rather than having 
merely the purpose or effect of discriminating against imported 
goods. Nonetheless, the long-continued use of virtually identical 
language in prior legislation, in con junction with the clear history 
of congressional concern with foreign import restrictions of all 
types, strongly supports an unqualified interpretation of the statu-
tory definition. 
The converse question relates to the authority of a foreign 
government to undertake commitments with respect to certain 
classes of restrictions. The legislative history of the 1962 act 
contains an occasional suggestion that some restrictions may be 
of such an essentially domestic character as to be non-negotiable.120 
118 Section 402(a), 76 Stat. 902, 19 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (Supp. IV, 1963). The language 
is virtually identical with that contained in § 350(e) of the prior law. 
119 Section 405(2), 76 Stat. 903, 19 U.S.C. § 1806(2) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
120 See, e.g., the comments of Representative Knox during hearings on the bill: 
"I was very much concerned about this so-called road tax that was imposed in accordance 
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The argument appears to be either that restrictions of this nature 
are not within the legal authority of the foreign government to 
regulate and are therefore not proper subjects for trade negotia-
tion, or that they involve domestic issues as to which the foreign 
government will not wish to assume an international commitment. 
In considering this question, it is necessary to distinguish the 
domestic authority of the foreign government over certain types 
of practice, from its legal capacity to undertake a binding inter-
national obligation with respect to them. Since the latter depends 
only upon the apparent authority of the negotiator, it follows that 
the foreign nation should be able to assume an international obli-
gation to regulate virtually any form of restrictive practice com-
plained of by the United States. Whether it will thereafter be 
legally in a position to fulfill its commitment is a separate question 
which turns upon its own domestic law. 
As a practical matter, of course, the foreign government may 
refuse to discuss what it may regard as a purely domestic matter. 
Moreover, it would be profitless to seek a concession which, if 
granted, could not legally be fulfilled by the other party. It is 
possible that in some countries, particularly in those which most 
sharply differ from our own in antitrust attitudes, certain forms 
of restrictions resulting from private action might be so classified.121 
2. Procedures To Obtain Evidence and To Conduct Negotiations 
To enable the executive branch to negotiate effectively con-
cerning foreign import restrictions, an adequate mechanism must 
be provided by which it can be advised of their existence in specific 
instances. It has been suggested in the foregoing discussion that, 
although there is much that government officials can and should 
do to keep themselves apprised of these restrictions, information 
of this nature is most readily available to domestic firms that seek 
to sell abroad. 
It has always been possible, of course, for private parties to 
with horsepower . • • . Is not that actually a foreign-domestic law and could not be 
taken into consideration as far as negotiations on tariffs are concerned?" Hearings on 
H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1549 
(1962). 
121 It is perhaps partly for this reason that the questionnaire recently circulated by 
the Department of Commerce to United States business firms and trade associations 
" (see note 25 supra) defines a non-tariff trade barrier as any restrictive governmental 
practice, and stipulates that "for the purposes of this questionnaire, this definition does 
not include impediments to trade resulting from the operation of foreign cartels, private 
monopolies, or other non-governmental business practices." 
1964] NON-TARIFF IMPORT RESTRICTIONS 1335 
advise the government informally concerning foreign import bar-
riers. Information obtained in this manner has frequently consti-
tuted the basis of ad hoc diplomatic representations by the United 
States to the foreign governments concerned. This technique, 
although not an adequate substitute for more formal procedures, 
is nonetheless a useful adjunct which will undoubtedly continue 
to be employed in many instances. 
The hearings required by statute to be held in advance of 
trade negotiations have afforded an additional forum for the pres-
entation of such information. Section 4 of the Trade Agreements 
Act of 1934, as amended, required that public notice, and an op-
portunity for interested parties to present their views, be accorded 
in advance of any proposed trade agreement.122 Section 3 of the 
Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1951, as amended, directed 
the Tariff Commission to investigate and report, with respect to 
each commodity considered for possible inclusion in trade agree-
ment negotiations, the extent to which United States duties or 
other import restrictions might be modified without causing or 
threatening serious injury to the competitive domestic industry.128 
In each instance, data and views were also required to be obtained 
from other government departments and agencies. Particularly in 
the case of investigations conducted pursuant to section 4 of the 
1934 act, domestic industries have frequently included in their 
presentations information concerning import restrictions which 
they have encountered abroad. 
The Trade Expansion Act of 1962 has continued the require-
ment that investigations be held in advance of proposed trade 
negotiations. Public hearings are provided before both the Tariff 
Commission124 and "an agency or an interagency committee" desig-
nated by the President.125 Preparations for the 1964 round of 
tariff negotiations demonstrate that considerably greater attention 
is currently being given to foreign import restrictions. The Trade 
Information Committee, which is the agency charged with con-
ducting public hearings pursuant to section 223 of the act, has 
indicated a particular interest in "non-tariff barriers imposed by 
other nations which the United States should seek to have removed 
or modified."126 
122 48 Stat. 945 (1934), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1354 (1958). 
123 65 Stat. 72 (1951), as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1360 (1958). 
124 Section 221, 76 Stat. 874-75, 19 U.S.C. § 1841 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
125 Section 223, 76 Stat. 875, 19 U.S.C. § 1843 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
120 Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Negotiations Under 
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The increased concern with foreign import restrictions during 
pre-negotiation investigations is clearly desirable. It would not, 
however, have constituted more than a partial response to the 
criticism raised during legislative hearings on the Trade Expan-
sion Act. Much of this criticism was directed to the absence of 
formal and definite procedures by which private parties could 
present such evidence to government officials at any time. As a 
corollary, it was urged that responsibility for receiving and acting 
on this evidence was not adequately defined and centralized 
within the executive branch. Prior to 1962, the formal hearing 
procedure was specifically provided by statute only as a prelude to 
trade negotiations. Moreover, responsibility for the administra-
tion of the trade agreements program was divided among various 
government departments and agencies. The Interdepartmental 
Committee on Trade Agreements, which was established to obtain 
detailed information and to evolve specific recommendations re-
garding the operation of the program, was composed of repre-
sentatives of nine departments and agencies and chaired by the 
representative from the Department of State. The Committee for 
Reciprocity Information, which conducted pre-negotiation hear-
ings, had generally the same composition but was chaired by the 
representative from the Tariff Commission. The cabinet-level 
Trade Policy Committee was chaired by the Secretary of Com-
merce.127 
The Trade Expansion Act abolished this tripartite division 
of responsibility, and in its place established a single administra-
tive agency which is charged with continuing responsibility for 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (Oct. 21, 1963). The Committee is also interested in 
United States import restrictions as to which concessions might be offered. Its "Sugges-
tions on the Preparation of Written Briefs and Oral Testimony" contains the following 
statement: 
"The Committee hopes that witnesses will particularly endeavor to provide it 
with specific information on non-tariff barriers which hamper export sales and to 
estimate the effects their removal would have upon American exports • • • • Since 
many of the restrictions in this category involve, among other elements, varying 
degrees of administrative interpretation and discretion, witnesses are urged to 
provide fully documented illustrations based on their own experience." Id. at 6. 
To the same effect see Ambassador Herter's statement at the White House Conference 
on Export Expansion: 
"We shall need your more specific help when the Trade Information Committee 
holds its hearings . • . . [W]e should like its hearings to focus largely upon 
determining which foreign tariffs and trade restrictions are most burdensome to 
United States exporters. We hope, therefore, that you will take full advantage of 
this opportunity to share with us this vital information, which your first-hand 
experience in the markets of the world uniquely qualifies you to give." U.S. Dep't 
of Commerce, Int'! Commerce 10 (Sept. 23, 1963). 
127 See generally Catudel, How a Trade Agreement Is Made, Dep't of State Pub. 
No. 7305 (Nov. 1961). 
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the trade agreements program. Section 241128 directs the President 
to appoint a Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, who 
is to lead the United States delegation at such negotiations and 
serve as chairman of the interagency trade organization established 
pursuant to section 242.129 This organization, which consists prin-
cipally of the heads of government departments or their represent-
atives, assists the President in administering the program and 
handling tariff adjustment cases. 
By Executive Order, the interagency trade organization has 
been designated the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.180 
It supersedes the prior Trade Policy Committee. Similarly, the 
Committee for Reciprocity Information has been replaced by the 
Trade Information Committee, and the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee on Trade Agreements has become the Trade Staff Commit-
tee. The latter two committees are chaired by members of the 
office of the Special Representative.181 Although the change in 
names is unimportant, it is significant that this administrative 
structure now reports directly to a single government official who 
has express statutory responsibility for assisting the President in 
administering the trade agreements program. 
The 1962 act also establishes a clearly defined procedure by 
which. private parties can, at any time, present evidence of foreign 
non-tariff restrictions which they believe to have hindered their 
export trade. This procedure has no antecedent in prior trade 
agreements legislation. Section 252(d) directs the President to 
"provide an opportunity for the presentation of views concerning 
foreign import restrictions which . . . are maintained against 
United States commerce" and to arrange for public hearings with 
respect thereto.182 This function has been delegated to the Trade 
Information Committee.133 A definite procedure has been estab-
lished by which evidence regarding such restrictions may be sub-
128 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1871 (Supp. IV, 1963). The regulations relating to the 
establishment, structure, and functions of the Office of the Special Representative appear 
at 48 C.F.R. § 201 (1964). 
120 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1871 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
130 Exec. Order No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order No. 
11106, 28 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1963), and Exec. Order No. 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963). 
131 See 48 C.F.R. § 202 (1964). There is also a Trade Executive Committee established 
by 48 C.F.R. § 202.l (1964). Its membership consists of departmental representatives at 
the assistant secretary level. It is chaired by a Deputy Special Representative for Trade 
Negotiations. 
132 76 Stat. 880, 19 U.S.C. § 1882(d) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
133 Exec. Order No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order No. 
11106, 28 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1963), and Exec. Order No. 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963); 48 
C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(2) (1964). 
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mitted to the Committee, either in written form or through the 
medium of public hearings.134 Information so obtained is fur-
nished in summary form to the Trade Staff Committee and to the 
Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.135 The Trade Staff 
Committee, in turn, reviews the information and transmits its 
recommendations through the Trade Executive Committee to the 
Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee.186 The latter com-
mittee informs the President as to the results of such hearings 
and recommends appropriate action.181 
Although it is too early to judge the effectiveness of this new 
procedure, it appears to have considerable potential value for 
domestic firms which have been able to obtain concrete evidence 
of foreign trade barriers.188 Section 252(d) does not limit the types 
of restrictions as to which evidence may be presented. By its terms, 
the procedure is available irrespective of whether the restrictions 
are asserted to be legally justifiable.189 It may be invoked at any 
time, and is not contingent upon the existence of a trade concession 
with respect to the article involved.140 Its broad availability reme-
dies a deficiency which had become increasingly apparent in prior 
trade agreements legislation. 
184 48 C.F.R. § 211.3 (1964). 
185 48 C.F.R. § 202.3(b)(2) (1964). 
136 48 C.F.R. § 202.2(b)(3) (1964). 
187 Section 242(b)(3), 76 Stat. 878, 19 U.S.C. § 1872(b)(3) (Supp. IV, 1963); Exec. Order 
No. 11075, 28 Fed. Reg. 473 (1963), as amended by Exec. Order 11106, 28 Fed, Reg, 3911 
(1963), and Exec. Order 11113, 28 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1963). 
138 "The importance of this [new procedure] should not be played down. It can be 
an effective force in the effort to establish the type of fair trade practices in international 
commerce which are essential to the stimulation of increased foreign trade." Separate 
Views of Hon. Thomas B. Curtis on H.R. 11970, H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
98 (1962), 
The regulations of the Trade Information Committee indicate that general allegations 
as to foreign restrictions will not support a request for a hearing, although the language 
of § 252(d) suggests that discretion to refuse a hearing may be limited. 48 C.F.R. § 211.3 
(1964) states that a request pursuant to § 252(d) will be granted "only if it identifies with 
particularity the foreign import restriction complained of, states the reasons why the 
restriction is believed to be of the kind covered by Sec. 252 of the Act, and describes 
concisely the effect of the restriction upon United States exports." Attempted use by a 
domestic firm of the procedures provided in § 252(d) as a means of obtaining otherwise 
unavailable information concerning the business operations of foreign competitors is not 
likely to be successful. 48 C.F.R. § 211.8 (1964) exempts from public inspection data sub-
mitted in confidence which the Committee considers to be of this character, and permits 
the submitting party to withdraw any such data to which the Committee denies con-
fidential status. 
139 See also 47 DEP'T STATE Buu.. 847, 849 (Dec. 3, 1962), stating that "a new provision 
has been added which requires the interagency trade organization to hold public hearings 
at which any interested persons may present their views on unjustifiable and unreasonable 
foreign import restrictions." 
140 The availability of a remedy may, of course, be affected by the existence or absence 
of a trade concession. See text infra. 
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After specific evidence of foreign import restrictions has been 
obtained by the executive branch, international negotiations to 
secure their removal may be conducted by a variety of means. It 
has been indicated that diplomatic representations are often made 
on an ad hoc basis to the foreign governments concerned. In 
addition, consultations are frequently conducted pursuant to the 
provisions of bilateral or multilateral international undertakings 
to which the United States is a party. These primarily include 
bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation, bilateral 
trade agreements,141 and various multilateral arrangements such 
as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. These international undertakings not 
only obligate the parties to observe codes of fair trade practice,142 
but also establish procedures for handling alleged violations. 
These procedures may be illustrated by reference to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Representations concerning 
foreign import restrictions may be made by the United States either 
in the course of trade negotiations conducted under the auspices 
of the General Agreement143 or in accordance with the various 
consultation and complaint procedures which the Agreement 
specifically provides. The most general of these provisions is 
Article XXII, which requires each contracting party to give "sym-
pathetic consideration" and "adequate opportunity for consulta-
tion" in the case of representations made by any other party, and 
permits the Contracting Parties, acting jointly, to participate in 
the consultation at the request of any party involved. Article XXIII 
requires each party to consider sympathetically the assertion by 
another party that a benefit accruing from the General Agree-
ment is being nullified or impaired. If the parties are unable to 
reach an accord, the question may be referred to the Contracting 
Parties in their collective capacity. The Contracting Parties may, 
141 It should be observed that most bilateral trade agreements concluded by the 
United States have been superseded by the subsequent accession of the parties to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
142 The substantive remedial rights to which these arrangements may give rise are 
beyond the scope of the present discussion. 
143 Non-tariff import restrictions will receive greater consideration in the 1964 tariff 
negotiations than on any previous occasion. The resolution adopted by the Ministerial 
Conference of the General Agreement on May 21, 1963, outlining principles and procedures 
to guide the 1964 negotiations, expressly provides that they "shall deal not only with 
tariffs but also with non-tariff barriers." The Conference established a Trade Negotiations 
Committee to determine detailed procedure for the negotiations, including the "rules 
to govern and the methods to be employed in the treatment of non-tariff barriers." 
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in their discretion, authorize compensatory action under Article 
XXIII or waive the obligation of a party under Article XXV. 
More specific provisions of the General Agreement require any 
party maintaining quantitative restrictions for balance of payments 
reasons to consult periodically with the Contracting Parties.144 
Consultation is also required if a party initiates or substantially 
increases such restrictions.145 Various other provisions require 
notice or consultation, or authorize compensatory adjustments, 
in the case of specific restrictive actions by a party. 
Pursuant to the requirement for periodic consultations regard-
ing balance of payments restrictions, the Contracting Parties have 
met with a number of countries to examine the extent of these 
restrictions, their significance for other parties and their com-
patibility with the General Agreement.146 The Contracting Parties 
have also required periodic reports from each party maintaining 
restrictions inconsistent with the General Agreement, whether or 
not within the terms of the protocol of provisional application. 
The United States has participated in these consultations and 
has invoked the formal complaint procedure on various occasions. 
It has recently taken steps under Articles XXIV and XXVIII to 
compensate for limitations imposed by the European Economic 
Community on imports of poultry from the United States. The 
language and legislative history of the Trade Expansion Act 
suggest that this country may henceforth be more inclined to 
invoke the remedial provisions of the General Agreement in the 
case of foreign restrictions on industrial as well as agricultural 
commodities. 
B. Substantive Authority To Seek Removal of Foreign Non-Tariff 
Import Restrictions 
Although the President's authority to negotiate regarding 
foreign non-tariff import restrictions is clear, a more complex 
question arises with respect to the scope of his substantive author-
ity to bargain for or demand their removal. What inducements 
may he offer, or in what forms may he threaten retaliation, in order 
to achieve his purpose? 
144 Article XII requires annual consultations. Article XVIII:B requires consultations 
at not less than two-year intervals in the case of less developed countries. 
145 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, arts. XII(4)(a), XVIII:B. 
146 As an example, consultations were held during 1962 with Brazil, Ceylon, Denmark, 
Finland, Ghana, Greece, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of South Africa, 
and Uruguay. 
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It is apparent that the United States has a wide range of pos-
sible means available to induce or coerce other nations to discon-
tinue such restrictions. Virtually every aspect of its relations with 
an offending nation may afford, at least in theory, a potential 
leverage for this purpose. In many instances, the trade agreements 
program as such may not be involved. The Randall Commission 
has suggested, for example, that the principle of domestic prefer-
ence contained in the Buy American Act should be suspended in 
evaluating bids submitted by nationals of countries whose procure-
ment policies do not discriminate against United States suppliers.147 
Such methods for seeking the removal of foreign restrictions 
undoubtedly are invoked from time to time. Frequently, however, 
they are not well adapted to that purpose. Moreover, their use 
may tend to interfere with the achievement of other objectives for 
which they were originally intended. For these reasons, the trade 
agreements program and related legislation ordinarily provide the 
most appropriate measure of the President's delegated authority to 
offer reciprocal concessions or to take retaliatory action.148 
To a limited degree, the basic authority to negotiate trade 
agreements provides an inherent mechanism both for persuasion 
and for coercion. Although the effectiveness of persuasion unac-
companied by the offer of a corresponding concession is plainly 
limited, it may occasionally be effective where the inequity of the 
foreign restriction is apparent and the reasons for its retention ~re 
not compelling. Conversely, the refusal to negotiate further trade 
agreements with a country maintaining such restrictions may 
comprise a useful form of coercion in some circumstances. Its 
effectiveness is considerably limited, however, both by the potential 
trade disadvantages to the United States and by the fact that under 
the most-favored-nation principle concessions granted in other 
trade negotiations ordinarily would become available automati-
cally to the offending nation. 
Domestic legislation contains three specific grants of authority 
which the President may employ in seeking the removal of foreign 
import barriers. One of these provisions, originally enacted in 
1890, permits him to refuse entry to articles from a foreign country 
147 COMI\USSION ON FOREIGN EcoNOI\UC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE 
CONGRESS 45 (1954). 
148 As in the case of the authority to negotiate, the present discussion does not con-
sider the extent to which the President may possess independent constitutional authority 
in this area. 
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which is unjustly discriminating against United States commerce.m 
This potentially drastic retaliatory measure is framed in discre-
tionary rather than mandatory language, and by its terms applies 
only to discrimination "made by or under the authority of" the 
foreign state. It would not appear, therefore, to authorize retal-
iation in those situations in which the discrimination results from 
purely private action. Moreover, as suggested below, the reference 
to "unjust" discrimination would presumably be construed to 
render the statute inapplicable in the case of restrictions which 
are legally valid, however burdensome in effect. 
The second specific legislative authorization is contained in 
section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.160 Unlike the 
preceding provision, section 338 reaches "unreasonable" as well 
as unjustifiable restrictions, but is more clearly limited to those 
which discriminate in the sense of placing United States commerce 
at a disadvantage compared with that of any third country. It 
directs the President, within certain limits and to the extent that 
he believes the national interest will thereby be benefited, to 
retaliate against such discrimination by imposing countervailing 
import duties. If this form of retaliation proves ineffective, the 
President is authorized, in his discretion, to refuse entry to articles 
produced in the offending country or transported in its vessels. 
It will be observed that both of these statutory provisions relate 
to foreign discrimination against any article of United States com-
merce. Furthermore, they authorize retaliation against any article 
imported from the offending country, whether or not it is subject 
to a trade concession granted by the United States. In several 
respects, the two provisions differ from the authority contained in 
the trade agreements legislation itself. 
I. Trade Agreements Authority To Offer Concessions 
To Obtain the Removal of Foreign Restrictions 
By definition, the basic trade agreements authority permits 
the President to offer an inducement in order to secure the removal 
of a foreign import restriction. This authority has been continued 
without substantive change since the program was initiated, and 
currently appears in section 20l(a) of the Trade Expansion Act 
, of 1962. This provision permits the President, when he finds that 
United States exports are being hindered either by tariffs or by 
149 26 Stat. 415-16 (1890). 
150 46 Stat. 704, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 1338 (1958). 
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other import restrictions, to enter into trade agreements and to 
"proclaim such modification or continuance of any existing duty 
or other import restriction, such continuance of existing duty-
free or excise treatment, or such additional import restrictions, as 
he deems to be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade 
agreement. "151 
The basic trade agreements authority has consistently limited 
the extent to which the President is permitted to adjust tariffs.1112 
In addition, his right to do so has, with certain exceptions,153 been 
subject to the general obligation to observe the standard of most-
favored-nation treatment.154 Subject to these qualifications, and 
except as limited elsewhere in the act, the President has been free 
to offer tariff concessions in return for the reduction or removal 
of any form of foreign import restriction. The basic trade agree-
ments authority, however, has not limited his right to modify 
or continue United States import restrictions other than tariffs. 
Prior to 1962, no other limitation existed in trade agreements 
legislation. The only specific delegation of authority to deal with 
foreign import restrictions, other than the basic agreement-making 
authority itself, was contained in the proviso of section 350(a)(5) 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended. It constituted an exception 
to the requirement of most-favored-nation treatment which com-
prised the remainder of the section. The proviso directed the 
President to suspend the application of a trade concession to im-
ports from any country which discriminated against United States 
commerce or engaged in other acts which in his opinion tended 
to defeat the objectives of the trade agreements program. It did 
not limit his authority to offer reciprocal concessions in return 
for the elimination of such restrictions.155 
151 Section 20l(a)(2), 76 Stat. 872, 19 U.S.C. § 182l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
152 Under the 1962 act, the President may not, with certain exceptions (e.g., in the 
case of trade with the European Economic Community where certain criteria are met), 
reduce a United States tariff by more than 50% below the rate existing on July 1, 1962 
(§ 20l(b)(l)), or increase it by more than 50% above the rate existing on July 1, 1934 
(§ 201 (b)(2)). 
153 The principal exception relates to imports from Communist countries. Insofar as 
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is concerned, see § 231, 76 Stat. 876-77, as amended, 19 
U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. IV, 1963). The extent to which § 252 of the act constitutes an 
additional exception is discussed in text infra. 
154 See the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, § 251, 76 Stat. 879, 19 U.S.C. § 1881 (Supp. 
IV, 1963). 
155 The directive to suspend concessions where foreign restrictions exist was not 
logically incompatible with the existence of authority to offer concessions to remove them. 
In any specific case, the President might have concluded, under the pre-1962 legislation, 
that retaliation would tend to defeat the purposes of the act whereas the negotiation of 
reciprocal concessions would have the opposite effect. He would therefore not have been 
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The successor to the proviso of section 350(a)(5) is section 252 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. Unlike the prior legislation, 
section 252 distinguishes between two categories of foreign import 
restrictions-those which are "unjustifiable" in the sense that they 
violate international obligations such as those contained in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and those which, al-
though legally justifiable, are regarded as "unreasonable."1~6 
Section 252(a)(2) specifically precludes the President from "nego-
tiating the reduction or elimination of any United States import 
restriction" pursuant to the basic trade agreements authority in 
order to obtain the removal of an unjustifiable foreign restriction. 
No such limitation appears in the case of unreasonable restrictions. 
This modification of prior legislation was deliberate. The 
qualifying language did not appear in the bill as originally drafted. 
It was added by the House Ways and Means Committee, which 
reported, "Your committee feels that the United States should 
not make concessions in exchange for removal or reduction of 
such unwarranted restrictions."157 Administration witnesses took 
the same position. Under Secretary of State George Ball advised 
the Ways and Means Committee that, insofar as unjustifiable 
foreign restrictions are concerned, "we shouldn't pay anything for 
the elimination of these and we don't intend to." In those cases 
in which the restrictions are legal but disadvantageous to United 
States commerce, he concluded that "this is a matter where we 
can use the bargaining powers that are provided under the Trade 
Act as well as we use them to obtain reductions in tariffs, and we 
intend to do so."158 
2. Trade Agreements Authority To Impose Domestic Import 
Restrictions To Obtain the Removal of Foreign Restrictions 
Trade agreements legislation has always authorized the Presi-
dent, in specified circumstances, to impose domestic import 
bound by the proviso of § 350(a)(5) and would have been free to act pursuant to § 350(a)(l). 
Alternatively, he might initially have invoked the proviso, and thereafter, if retaliation 
proved unsuccessful, have concluded a new agreement under § 350(a)(l) in order to 
achieve his purpose. Furthermore, the proviso could not logically have been construed 
as an implied prohibition against offering concessions to secure the removal of restrictions 
imposed by nations which had received no previous concessions from the United States. 
156 For one discussion of this distinction, see testimony of Under Secretary of State 
George Ball, Hearings on H.R. 11970 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 87th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 2204-05, 2264 (1962). The House and Senate committee reports also 
recognize the distinction. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1962). 
157 H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1962). 
158 Hearings on R.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 2246. 
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restrictions as a means of seeking the removal of foreign trade 
barriers. An express statutory provision for this purpose has been 
included in each successive enactment of the program.1119 It has 
been noted above that prior to 1962 this provision directed the 
President to suspend concessions to any country imposing restric-
tions which in his view tended to nullify the objectives of the 
program.160 The statutory language was succinct. It did not 
distinguish between these restrictions on the basis of their legal 
validity.161 With the exception of a single parenthetical reference 
to international cartels, it avoided the uncertainties which tend 
to result from the inclusion of specific examples in legislation of 
general applicability. By contrast, section 252 of the Trade Ex-
pansion Act is verbose and repetitive. It contains ambiguities 
caused largely by provisions designed to benefit particular interests. 
The section classifies foreign restrictions according to legal distinc-
169 The basic trade agreements authority may afford an additional ground for retali-
atory action. Section 20l(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act permits the President to pro-
claim "such additional import restrictions, as he deems to be required or appropriate 
to carry out any such trade agreement." Prior trade agreements legislation contained 
virtually identical language. The provision has customarily been regarded as authorizing 
increases in duties or other import restrictions pursuant to an escape clause or tariff 
adjustment action. It would also appear, however, to permit the President, if he finds 
that the benefits of a trade concession obtained by the United States are being impaired 
as a result of restrictions imposed by the nation granting the concession, to take retaliatory 
action as a means of persuading that nation to "carry out" the trade agreement according 
to its original terms. Such action would, of course, be proper only if consistent with the 
purposes stated in § 102 of the act. 
Although no instance is known in which retaliation has been sought to be justified by 
reference to the basic trade agreements authority, there would seem to be no conceptual 
difficulty with this approach. Its potential significance results from the fact that the scope 
of permissible action under § 201 would differ from that under § 252. Under the former 
provision, the President could retaliate against any article imported from a country which 
imposes restrictions impairing the value of a concession previously granted to the United 
States, if he considered that such action would encourage the offending country to honor 
its original commitment. Under § 252, by contrast, he is limited to the withdrawal of 
concessions granted by the United States to that country. On the other hand, under § 252 
the President may retaliate against any restriction imposed by another country, whether 
or not it affects an article as to which the United States has received a concession. 
Section 201 would permit him to take such action only to protect the value of a concession 
previously obtained by the United States. The scope of retaliation under § 201 would 
therefore be both broader and narrower than under § 252. 
160 Prior to 1955, the language was permissive rather than mandatory. Since in either 
case retaliation was contingent on presidential discretion as to the impact of foreign 
restrictions on the operation of the act, the 1955 amendment can only be regarded as a 
mild form of legislative exhortation. 
161 In practice, the United States has consistently invoked this distinction when 
deciding whether to take retaliatory action pursuant to the proviso of § 350(a)(5). Where, 
for example, foreign restrictions have been sanctioned for balance of payments reasons 
under articles XII or XIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, this country 
has refused to apply the proviso on the ground that the restrictions neither discriminate 
against United States commerce nor tend to defeat the objectives of the trade agreements 
program. See, e.g., Metzger, The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 51 GEo. L.J. 425, 436 (1963). 
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tions which, although important, may prove to extend its language 
more than they affect its administration. 
The retaliatory provisions of section 252 are best understood 
by reference to their legislative history. As originally drafted by 
the executive branch, they followed closely the language of the 
proviso of section 350(a)(5).162 The Ways and Means Committee 
rewrote the. section in a manner intended to emphasize congres-
sional concern with illegal foreign restrictions. To this end, the 
committee (I) added language characterizing such restrictions as 
"unjustifiable" or "inconsistent with provisions of trade agree-
ments," (2) amplified the directive to the President to withhold 
trade concessions from the offending nation by specifying not only 
that he is to suspend, but alternatively that he is to withdraw, pre-
vent the application of, or refrain from proclaiming such conces-
sions, 168 and (3) directed the President generally to "take all appro-
priate and feasible steps within his power," other than offering 
reciprocal concessions, in order to remove foreign restrictions.m 
As noted above, the first of these changes makes explicit the 
interpretation which the executive branch had consistently given 
to the previous statutory language. The second has a compara-
ble effect. The third might initially appear to have a broader 
significance. Depending on the construction given to the words 
"appropriate and feasible," which would presumably be deter-
mined by the President, the language could be regarded on its face 
as authorizing retaliation in any form against any article imported 
from a country maintaining unjustifiable restrictions adversely 
affecting United States commerce. For several reasons, however, 
such an interpretation is unlikely. First, it would represent a 
major extension in the scope of the retaliatory authority as con-
sistently embodied in prior trade agreements legislation. Despite 
increased congressional concern with foreign restrictive devices, 
there is no indication in the legislative history of the 1962 act that 
any such sweeping alteration was intended. Second, so broad an 
authorization would necessarily include, an~ thereby render super-
162 Section 242, H.R. 9900, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
163 It may be observed that under this provision, as under prior trade agreements 
legislation, the President may withdraw all existing concessions on a commodity. In such 
a case, the effect would be to return to the rate of duty established by the Tariff Act 
of 1930. See Dep't of State memorandum, Hearings on R.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 2278. 
164 For these amendments, see generally § 252, H.R. 11970 in the House of Representa-
tives, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). As noted supra, the committee also added to § 252 a 
paragraph specifying the procedure by which information concerning foreign restrictions 
can be presented to the executive branch. 
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fl.nous, the more limited language providing for the withdrawal of 
concessions. Consistency between the two provisions is assured only 
if the former is regarded as merely hortatory. Finally, the Senate 
appears to have followed this interpretation in adopting the 
Williams amendment, 165 which provides for a broader scope of 
retaliatory action than might be required if the House language 
embodied an additional substantive authority. 
The net effect of the retaliatory amendments adopted by the 
Ways and Means Committee, therefore, is to focus attention on 
the existence of these remedial measures and to communicate more 
forcefully to the executive branch the intention that they be used. 
The committee report states: 
"Your committee does not believe that there can be effec-
tive use of the trade agreement process to lower trade barriers . 
if unjustifiable restrictions of a tariff or nontariff nature are 
maintained or erected, or other actions are taken which are 
inconsistent with trade agreement commitments . . . . Your 
committee expects that every reasonable effort will be made 
to bring about the removal of such unjustifiable restrictions 
so that the objectives of the trade agreements program will be 
attained. Your committee also expects that as new obstruc-
tions to trade appear, every reasonable effort will be made 
to stop them."166 
The purpose of the House amendments is commendable. As a 
matter of legislative drafting, however, it is regrettable that the 
method adopted was to extend and complicate unnecessarily the 
statutory language. The consequence was to create apparent dis-
tinctions which in fact do not exist. 
The preceding discussion has indicated that the separate and 
coordinate treatment of the authority to "take all appropriate and 
feasible steps" to remove unjustifiable foreign restrictions, and the 
authority to withdraw trade concessions for this purpose, might 
seem to suggest the delegation of two substantive powers where 
only one was intended. Similarly, the drafting distinction be-
tween countries maintaining restrictions "inconsistent with pro-
visions of trade agreements" and those engaged in acts "unjusti-
fiably restricting United States commerce"167 could logically imply 
165 Section 252(a)(3), 76 Stat. 879 (1962), 19 U.S.C. § 1882(a)(3) (Supp. IV, 1963). See 
text infra. 
166 H. REP. No. 1818, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1962). 
167 Sections 252(b)(l), (2), 76 Stat. 879 (1962), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1882(b)(l), (2) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
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a legal distinction not contemplated by the legislation. In fact, 
the separate reference to restrictions inconsistent with trade agree-
ments may have been primarily intended as a drafting vehicle for 
the inclusion of language relating specifically to variable import 
fees, which were. of particular concern to agricultural interests. 
Instead of simplifying the House language, the Senate further 
complicated it. The two principal additions were the Williams 
amendment, relating to agricultural products, and the Douglas 
amendment, which is concerned with foreign restrictions that are 
"unreasonable" but not illegal. Although the Williams amend-
ment is included in the portion of section 252 which by its terms 
relates exclusively to unjustifiable restrictions, and although gram-
matically the amendment refers only to such restrictions, it none-
theless provides for retaliatory action "notwithstanding any pro-
vision of any trade agreement under this Act." Moreover, 
retaliation is not limited to the withdrawal of trade concessions, 
but may consist of either tariff or non-tariff restrictions applied 
against any article imported from the offending country. In the 
case of agricultural products, therefore, the amendment signifi-
cantly extends the prior legislative authority to retaliate.168 It 
reflects the underlying concern with foreign agricultural restric-
tions, particularly those maintained by the European Economic 
Community, which largely influenced the drafting of section 252. 
The Douglas amendment is a logical consequence of the House 
revisions which had limited the scope of section 252 to foreign 
restrictions that are legally unjustifiable. In order to preserve the 
President's right under the trade agreements legislation to retaliate 
against foreign trade barriers which, although legal, are burden-
some to United States commerce,169 it was necessary either to revert 
168 The Senate version of the Williams amendment gave the President no discretion 
to refrain from taking retaliatory action against imports from countries maintaining 
restrictions on United States agricultural exports, except that he was permitted to deter-
mine the extent to which retaliation was necessary to remove the restrictions and to 
obtain access to the foreign market. The House accepted the amendment with the 
modification that the President is required to retaliate only "to the extent he deems 
necessary and appropriate." H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). 
169 As discussed in text infra, exercise of this authority could involve the United States 
in a breach of its international obligations. Its existence, however, may be helpful in 
negotiating with the offending country. See the statement of the Senate Finance Committee: 
"It is anticipated that the authority of the new subsection (c) of section 252 will 
prove useful in direct negotiations with other countries as a means of persuading 
them to reduce unreasonably high import restrictions prior to the bargaining process 
or as the means for inducing that country to end its discriminatory treatment of 
goods from third countries, or to induce a third country benefiting indirectly 
from U.S. concessions to grant the U.S. concessions in return for such indirect benefits." 
S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962). 
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to the earlier formula contained in the proviso of section 35O(a)(5) 
of the Tariff Act of 1930 or to incorporate an additional provision 
dealing specifically with this category of restrictions. The Senate 
chose the latter course. It recognized, however, that retaliation 
against justifiable trade barriers might involve the United States 
in an undesirable breach of its international commitments. Ac-
cordingly, whereas retaliation in the case of unjustifiable restric-
tions is mandatory to the extent that it is consistent with the 
purposes of the act, in the case of unreasonable restrictions the 
statutory language is permissive. Moreover, in the latter case 
the President is to consider not only the purposes of the act but 
also the international obligations of the United States. The pur-
pose of the second qualification is, as stated by the Senate Finance 
Committee, to avoid "any indiscriminate breach" of such obli-
gations.170 
As finally adopted, therefore, section 252, like prior trade 
agreements legislation, authorizes retaliation against foreign re-
strictions on non-agricultural imports only to the extent of 
withdrawing concessions previously granted to the offending 
country or refusing to proclaim concessions negotiated but not 
yet in effect. In the case of foreign agricultural restrictions, section 
252 permits retaliation against any article imported from that 
country, at least where the restriction is unjustified. In all cases, 
the President's obligation to act in accordance with the purposes 
of the statute affords him considerable discretion to decline to 
take retaliatory measures. 
During legislative consideration of the 1962 act, various ad-
ditional amendments were proposed which were designed to 
encourage the use of retaliation against foreign trade barriers. 
These proposals were of two general types. The first would have 
extended the application of the retaliatory authority in all cases 
to commodities not subject to trade concessions and would have 
enlarged the sanctions which the President could invoke. The 
second would have limited his discretion to refrain from taking 
retaliatory action. The fact that the Congress declined to adopt 
these proposals affords additional evidence of the scope of the 
authority as finally enacted. 
The first of these categories is illustrated by the proposal to 
supplement the provision for the withdrawal of concessions granted 
to an offending country, by authorizing the President to "impose 
110 Ibid. 
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additional import restrictions on the products of such country."171 
This proposal would have extended to all products the additional 
authority specifically delegated by the Williams amendment in 
the case of agricultural commodities. 
The Senate Finance Committee proposed an amendment in 
even broader terms. It would have authorized the President, when-
ever -he found such action to be in the national interest, to impose 
new or increased duties or other import restrictions to whatever 
extent he deemed necessary on any imported article.172 The com-
mittee asserted: 
· "This additional authority ... is ... based on the national 
interest and is intended to give the President broad powers 
to meet any trends toward unreasonable foreign restrictions 
on U.S. exports or exports from third countries which must 
otherwise find a market in the United States. This provision 
strengthens the President's hand in any negotiations or repre-
sentations to foreign governments when any unreasonable 
restrictions on U.S. trade are being imposed abroad."178 
The Finance Committee proposal largely reflected legislative 
conc~rn that the President's powers might not be adequate to 
secure the removal of foreign trade restrictions. On several oc-
casions during hearings on the bill, the suggestion was made that 
he be delegated authority to "increase" duties for this purpose. 174 
171 Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 1322-23. There is some indication that 
the proposal was predicated on the erroneous assumption that subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) of § 252(b) only authorize the withdrawal of tariff concessions. The brief in support 
of the proposed subparagraph (C) states that "subsections [(A) and (B)] approach the 
problem from the duty standpoint. The proposed amendment authorizes an approach 
from an additional angle. There will be instances where the suspension, withdrawal, etc., 
of a duty might not provide the necessary leverage but the imposition of additional im-
port restrictions on products of a recalcitrant country would force that country to live 
up to its obligations by removing unjustified barriers," Other language in the brief 
recognizes, however, that concessions may take the form either of reduction (or binding) 
of duties or of "removal of restriction or barriers to trade." 
172 Section 353, H.R. 11970 in the Senate· of the United States, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1962). Section 353 would have delegated this authority unreservedly "notwithstanding 
any other provision of law," upon a finding by the President that such action would be 
in the national interest. 
178 S. REP. No. 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). 
174 See, e.g., the comments of Senator Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 
156, at 168-70, and his statement at 1879: 
"I tend to favor an amendment which would give to the President the power to 
increase tariffs if that power can be used to obtain decreases in the tariffs or 
restrictions which other countries impose upon us. But I do not want to negate the 
basic principle _of the Trade Expansion Act. I would like to have this as an excep• 
tion to the powers granted to the President, and as a supplementary power granted 
to him to induce the European countries to reduce their tariffs in case mutual 
reductions are not sufficient to move them." 
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Administration officials pointed out that, because the United States 
has given concessions on most imported articles since 1930, the 
authority to withdraw concessions in fact comprises a substantial 
authority to increase duties.175 Furthermore, they correctly ob-
served that an unjustified increase in duty, whether or not effected 
through the withdrawal of a concession, would necessitate com-
pensatory concessions to, or give rise to a right of retaliation by, 
any adversely affected party to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade.176 
The provision adopted by the Finance Committee would have 
conferred an unqualified discretion on the President. Unlike 
the authority to withdraw concessions, it would have been subject 
to no standards except his judgment as to the national interest. In 
addition to providing a further basis for retaliation, therefore, it 
would have comprised a continuing invitation to circumvent the 
statutory criteria for tariff adjustment and other forms of relief 
to domestic interests. Largely for these reasons, it was deleted by 
the conference committee.177 
Another proposal to increase the severity of retaliatory sanc-
tions would have required at least partial return to the standard 
of conditional most-favored-nation treatment. Since 1923, the 
United States has followed an unconditional most-favored-nation 
policy by which trade concessions granted to any country are auto-
matically generalized to others without regard to benefits obtained 
from them in return.178 The principal motivations for this policy 
have been to broaden the liberalizing impact of concessions on 
international trade and to reduce the complexity of negotiations. 
An integral element of its effectiveness has been the adoption of 
comparable policies by other nations. 
By contrast, under the policy of conditional most-favored-na-
tion treatment, the generalization of trade benefits to third 
countries is a negotiating matter which depends upon the offer 
of equivalent concessions. During the legislative hearings, it was 
175 See note 163 supra. 
176 Statement of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jack. N. Behrman, Hearings on H.R. 
11970, supra note 156, at 170. See also letter from Secretary Hodges to Senator Douglas, 
id. at 2280-81. 
177 H.R. REP. No. 2518, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1962). For one statement of objections 
to § 353, see individual views of Senator Carl T. Curtis on H.R. 11970, S. REP. No. 2059, 
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1962). 
178 A limited number of exceptions to this principle have been adopted by statute. 
These have included preferential treatment to certain countries and denial of most-
favored-nation treatment to others. As noted at note 153, supra, the principal exception 
today is the denial of such benefits to Communist countries. 
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suggested that a return to this policy might provide further lever-
age for the removal of foreign import restrictions.179 It would 
almost certainly have caused other countries, however, to curtail 
most-favored-nation treatment to the United States. In view of the 
adverse consequences to United States exports, as well as to inter-
national trade generally, it is fortunate that the proposal was not 
adopted. 
The second type of proposed amendment would have qualified 
the President's discretion to refrain from retaliating against for-
eign trade barriers. One method suggested for this purpose was to 
delete the statutory reference to the purposes of the act in the 
provision relating to the withdrawal of concessions.180 This change 
would have made retaliation mandatory against every foreign 
restriction to which the provision applied. It was further suggested 
that the word "unjustifiable" also be deleted, thereby requiring 
the application of sanctions in the case of any foreign restriction 
against United States commerce irrespective of its legal validity.181 
A third proposal would have amended the agreement-making 
authority to require each such agreement to prohibit enumerated 
discriminatory practices, thereby limiting presidential discretion 
to determine whether these specific acts by foreign countries were 
intended to be made subject to the retaliatory sanction.182 
Although some of the foregoing proposals were undoubtedly 
179 See, e.g., the inquiry of Senator Douglas, Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, 
at '22.77. As advocated during the hearings, the proposal to "deny most-favored-nation 
treatment" had several possible meanings, including (1) to preclude the generalization of 
any trade concession to a nation other than the one with which it was negotiated; (2) to 
suspend most-favored-nation treatment to any nation imposing import restiictions on any 
United States export (Hearings on H.R. 9900 Before the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1235 (1962)); (3) to suspend the generalization of any trade 
concession to a nation declining to grant as favorable terms to the comparable commodity 
imported from the United States (id. at 1546); (4) to suspend the generalization of any 
such concession to a nation discriminating against imports from third countries (id. at 
3132). It is apparent that, in differing degrees, these proposals would have extended the 
sanctions available under § 252. 
180 Id. at 2773. See also the amendments to H.R. 11970 proposed by Senator Bush, 
Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 1128. 
181 Ibid. Senator Bush maintained that deletion of the word "unjustifiable" would 
not make presidential action mandatory where the foreign restriction was legal. He based 
his argument on the fact that the proposed amendment would retain the provision for 
retaliation against restrictions "inconsistent with provisions of trade agreements." Id. 
at 1854-55. It would also, however, have required such action in the case of foreign import 
barriers that were otherwise restrictive of United States commerce. Since the two pro-
visions were alternative and coordinate, his amendment would clearly have made retalia-
tion mandatory even in the case of justifiable restrictions. 
182 Hearings on H.R. 9900, supra note 179, at 2773. By its terms, the proposal would 
have amended only the special authority to conclude trade agreements with the European 
Economic Community. 
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motivated by protectionist sentiments, it seems clear that others 
resulted from a genuine concern that foreign non-tariff restrictions 
might vitiate the benefits sought to be obtained through reduc-
tions in rates of duty. It is to be hoped that the legislative history 
will be useful in prompting remedial action by the executive branch 
in appropriate cases. In view of the close interrelationships that 
necessarily exist, however, between international trade policy and 
other foreign economic and political objectives of the United 
States, it would have been unwise to deprive the President of dis-
cretion to determine whether specific circumstances warrant im-
position of the statutory sanctions. 
It should be presumed that the United States will normally 
wish to exercise these sanctions consistently with its international 
obligations. Before deciding what action to take regarding a for-
eign import restriction, therefore, the United States must ascertain 
whether the restriction is legally valid. In event of controversy, 
it will presumably be necessary to invoke the mechanism for 
resolving such disputes provided in the instrument asserted to 
have been infringed. In the most common case, this will be the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. It has been noted that 
under Article XXIII of the General Agreement, a contracting 
party which believes that a benefit accruing under the Agreement 
is being impaired by the action of another party, and which re-
ceives no satisfaction in bilateral consultations, may raise the 
question with the Contracting Parties collectively. The Contract-
ing Parties may, if they believe the circumstances warrant, au-
thorize the offended party to retaliate to the extent they deem 
appropriate, irrespective of whether they conclude that the orig-
inal impairment was the result of action inconsistent with the 
obligations of the Agreement. In exceptional circumstances, they 
may grant the offending party a waiver under Article XXV even 
if the action involved has violated the Agreement. 
The provisions of section 252 and those of the General Agree-
ment thus do not fully correspond. If the United States were to 
assert that a given foreign import restriction violates the Agree-
ment, and the Contracting Parties were to permit retaliation 
without affirming the violation, a question might arise as to 
whether the criterion of "unjustifiability" under section 252 had 
technically been met.183 Conversely, if the Contracting Parties were 
183 In this event, the United States could presumably base retaliation on the "unreason-
able" rather than the "unjustifiable" authority of § 252. 
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to recognize the violation but waive the obligation, retaliation 
pursuant to section 252 might be inconsistent with the commit-
ments of the United States under the General Agreement.184 
It is conceivable that the foreign nation imposing the restric-
tion may be neither a party to a multilateral international under-
taking such as the General Agreement nor to any commercial 
treaty, trade agreement, or other bilateral instrument defining its 
trade obligations toward the United States. Moreover, import 
restrictions of the types under consideration are not normally 
within the purview of customary international law. In these cir-
cumstances, retaliation under section 252 would presumably not 
violate any international obligation of the United States. It would, 
however, be necessary to characterize the foreign restriction as 
"unreasonable" rather than "unjustifiable" within the meaning of 
that section. 
In seeking to invoke the provisions of section 252(c), relating 
to unreasonable restrictions substantially burdening United States 
commerce, comparable considerations apply. Although on its face 
this determination is to be made unilaterally by the United States, 
in fact the withdrawal of a trade concession where the action of 
the other party is not illegal ( or where, under the General Agree-
ment, the Contracting Parties have not authorized retaliation ir-
respective of the legality of the original restriction) might involve 
the United States in a breach of its international obligations.185 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The executive branch has long possessed authority under trade 
agreements and other legislation to seek the removal of foreign 
import restrictions other than tariffs. In part, this authority is in-
herent in the statutory right to conclude trade agreements with 
foreign nations; in part, it derives from express legislative pro-
184 These distinctions between § 252 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
arise from the fact that the latter instrument recognizes that commitments between the 
contracting parties are based on the principle of mutual benefit. Consequently, where 
circumstances have sufficiently altered, the General Agreement may allow commitments 
to be modified although no breach of contractual obligation by another party may have 
occurred. The same essentially pragmatic attitude underlies the waiver provision. It may 
not always be possible, on the technical level, to reconcile this approach with that of 
§ 252, which is framed in terms of legal rather than economic justification. 
lSIS It is for this reason that § 252(c) provides for retaliation "to the extent that such 
action is consistent with" the objectives of the act, and directs the President to have 
a "due regard for the international obligations of the United States." The effect of the 
statutory language is therefore hortatory. 
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v1s1ons relating to the use of inducement or coercion for this 
purpose. 
It is frequently asserted that the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
significantly broadens these statutory powers. Secretary of Com-
merce Hodges, in testimony before the Senate Finance Committee, 
expressed the view that the bill "strengthens our hand against both 
tariff and nontariff barriers."186 The 1963 report of the President 
on the trade agreements program asserts that "the new Act 
strengthens previous provisions for dealing with unjustifiable or 
unreasonable restrictions that impede the access of American 
products to foreign markets."187 
In fact, however, the 1962 act narrows rather than extends the 
. President's statutory right to offer trade concessions to obtain the 
removal of foreign restrictions. Except in the case of agricultural 
products, it does not significantly affect the scope of his power 
under trade agreements legislation to retaliate against such restric-
tions. It makes no change in prior statutory provisions authorizing 
him to impose additional duties on, or to exclude, articles imported 
from countries discriminating against United States commerce. 
These latter sanctions, which are not part of the trade agreements 
program, are potentially severe. Like the retaliatory provisions 
contained in trade agreements legislation, however, they have 
rarely been invoked. 
It may be concluded that these statutory powers afford the 
President adequate authority to act with respect to foreign non-
tariff import barriers. In practice, however, his freedom to do 
so is circumscribed by pragmatic considerations which legislation 
cannot resolve. He must act within the context of a system of inter-
national obligations which the United States will not ordinarily 
wish to breach. In practice, therefore, the negotiation of reciprocal 
concessions will probably continue to be the preferred means of 
obtaining the removal of foreign restrictions which are legally 
justifiable.188 
It should also be recognized that nations which persist in main-
taining legally indefensible restrictions, despite strong external 
pressures to remove them, may be motivated by compelling do-
mestic reasons which the withdrawal of a trade concession or the 
186 Hearings on H.R. 11970, supra note 156, at 54. 
187 PRESIDENT'S 7TH ANN. REP. ON THE TRADE AGREEMENTS PROGRAM 18 (1963). 
188 In the case of a restriction which, although inconsistent with the General Agree• 
ment, has been granted a waiver by the Contracting Parties, a question might arise as to 
the propriety of offering a concession under § 252(a)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act. 
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imposition of additional import restrictions by the United States 
is unlikely to outweigh. In many instances, however, restrictions 
originally justified for balance of payments or other reasons are 
continued primarily at the urging of domestic interest groups 
which have become accustomed to rely upon them. Under such 
circumstances, the statutory sanctions available to the President 
may prove effective. 
Finally, any exercise of retaliation is pro tanto a further restric-
tion upon trade. Moreover, even where it is legally justified it may 
invite reciprocal action by the affected nation. For these reasons, 
the executive branch will presumably resort to retaliation prin-
cipally in those instances in which it appears likely to have a 
relatively prompt remedial effect. 
The primary significance of section 252, therefore, is not that 
it effects a major change in the substantive power to eliminate 
foreign non-tariff import barriers, but rather that it constitutes a 
mandate to the executive branch to give greater attention to the 
disruptive effects of these barriers and to undertake determined 
efforts to remove them. The more formal and definite procedures 
for this purpose established by the 1962 act are potentially its most 
important contribution to this end. Their effectiveness will depend 
not only on the seriousness with which the problem of foreign 
restrictions is regarded within the executive branch, but also upon 
the vigor and thoroughness with which private parties prepare 
and present their cases through the mechanism provided by sec-
tion 252(d). Effective utilization of this procedure could have a 
substantial influence on the eventual success of the United States 
in expanding foreign markets for its products. 
